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New research about cyber-physical systems is rapidly changing the way we
think about critical infrastructures such as the power grid. Changing requirements
for the generation, storage, and availability of power are all driving the development
of the smart-grid. Many smart-grid projects disperse power generation across a wide
area and control devices with a distributed system. However, in a distributed system,
the state of processes is hard to determine due to isolation of memory. By using
information flow security models, we reason about a process’s beliefs of the system
state in a distributed system. Information flow analysis aided in the creation of
Markov models for the expected behavior of a cyber controller in a smart-grid system
using a communication network with omission faults. The models were used as part of
an analysis of the distributed system behavior when there are communication faults.
With insight gained from these models, existing congestion management techniques
were extended to create a feedback mechanism, allowing the cyber-physical system
to better react to issues in the communication network.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The design of stochastic models of distributed systems has a long history
as a challenging area of interest. Models of distributed systems have to consider
many factors, such as various types of failure the system could experience, a lack
of tightly synchronized execution, and a large complex state space when there are
many agents[31][8]. However, the concept of distributed systems plays a central role
in how critical infrastructures will operate in the future. These critical infrastruc-
tures are physical networks whose operation are so vital that if those networks failed
to operate correctly it would be highly detrimental to the population that relies on
those systems. Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are the integration of computational
systems with physical networks. Computational systems already play a major role
in most critical infrastructures, and as demand for security features, such as acces-
sibility, increases, distributed systems are a favorable choice over centralized control
for the computational needs for these systems because they offer intelligent, localized
control[71].
The Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management (FREEDM)
center[56], envisions a future power grid with widely distributed renewable power
generation and storage closely coupled with a distributed system that facilitates the
dispatch of power across those areas. Other systems like Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
(VANET)[47][60][32] and air traffic control systems[64][6] also propose similar control
systems where many computers must cooperate to ensure both smooth operation
and the safety of the people using those systems. As a consequence, ensuring that
the computer systems that control those infrastructures behave correctly during fault
conditions is critical, especially when those computer systems rely on their interaction
with other computers to operate.
2A robust CPS should be able to survive and adapt to communication network
outages in both the physical and cyber domains. When an outage occurs, the physical
or cyber components must take corrective action to allow the rest of the system to
continue operating normally. Additionally, processes may need to react to the state
change of some other process. Managing and detecting when other processes have
failed is commonly handled by a leader election algorithm and failure detector.
In a smart-grid system, misbehavior during fault conditions could lead to
critical failures such as a blackout or voltage collapse. In a VANET or air traffic
control system, vehicles could collide, injuring passengers or destroying property.
Additionally, because these systems are a part of critical infrastructure, protecting
them from malicious entities is an important consideration.
We were motivated by observations on the effects of lost messages on the
group management module of the Distributed Grid Intelligence (DGI) used by the
FREEDM smart-grid project. The original observations confirmed the need to explore
more well-defined models for the behaviors of CPS in order for them to better serve
the people who use them.
We present a framework for reasoning about inferable state in the context of
a distributed system. To do this, we exploit existing work in the field of information
flow security, which has been used to reason how attacks like Stuxnet can manipulate
operators’ beliefs while disrupting a system[26]. In particular, approaches in infor-
mation flow security reason how the operator in a Stuxnet attack has no avenue to
verify the reports from a compromised computing device. Using existing modal logic
frameworks and information flow security models[37][26][38], one can formally reason
where information, not normally known to a domain, can be inferred.
With the correct information flows, an agent in a distributed system can infer
the state of other agents in the system. With this information, an agent can construct
3a reasonable model of the system to determine if the current behavior could lead to
an undesirable situation with either the cyber or physical network.
Using the framework, we present a leader election algorithm which can be
modeled with a Markov chain for a known omission fault[19] rate. The presented
algorithm maintains the Markov property for the observations of the leader despite
omission faults. Our approach to considering how a distributed system interacts
during a fault condition allows for the creation of new techniques for managing a
fault scenario in cyber-physical systems. In the context of FREEDM, these models
produce expectations of how much time the DGI will be able to spend coordinating
and doing useful work. With this information, the behavior of the control system for
the physical devices can be adjusted to prevent faults.
We also propose using existing schemes to detect communication network con-
gestion and inform processes in a CPS of impending congestion. Processes act on
congestion information to change their behavior in anticipation of message delays or
loss. Using an alternative behavior allows them to harden themselves against the
congestion, and allows them to continue operating as normally as possible during
the congestion. The technique involves changing the behavior of both the leader
election[30] and physical device management algorithm during congestion.
To detect and inform agents of that congestion, we extend existing network-
ing concepts of Random Early Detection (RED), Explicit Congestion Notification
(ECN)[59], and ICMP source quench[9]. When a network device detects congestion, it
notifies processes of the congestion, and they should react appropriately. We demon-
strate an implementation of the FREEDM DGI in a Network Simulator 3 (NS-3)
simulation environment[18] with our congestion detection feature. The DGI oper-
ates normally until the simulation introduces a traffic flow, congesting the network
devices in the simulation. After congestion has been identified by the RED queuing
algorithm, the DGI are informed. When the congestion notifications are introduced,
4the DGI maintains configurations which they would normally be unable to maintain
during congestion. Additionally, we show a greater amount of work can be done
without the work causing unstable power settings to be applied.
52 BACKGROUND
Distributed systems are a computing paradigm characterized by independence
of computational units and no universal clock. Components in a distributed system
may not directly share computational resources or memory. Instead, computers in a
distributed system typically interact through a message-passing interface.
As a result, distributed computing is a challenging area of research. In a dis-
tributed system, because processes do not share a universal clock, the ordering of
messages and events needed to be carefully considered to ensure correct operation
of the system. Additionally, when individual components fail, determining which
components failed and how they affected the system as a whole is difficult in a dis-
tributed system. Different types of failures can cause different kinds of information
to be withheld or changed, disrupting those processes.
In this section, the core concepts of distributed systems are presented. This
section also describes the concepts necessary to understand the models presented in
subsequent sections.
2.1 EXECUTION AND COMMUNICATION MODELS
We consider a distributed system where no processes in the system share an
address space. All processes must use a message-passing interface to communicate
with other processes to exchange information. As a result of the complexities of
distributed systems, various execution models have been developed to define how the
execution of a distributed system proceeds. Different execution models affect how
easy it is to reason about the system’s execution, the types of algorithms the system
can execute, and how complicated they are to implement.
62.1.1 Communication Channels. We describe the avenues of communica-
tion between processes as channels. A channel is classified as reliable if it meets three
axioms[31]:
Axiom 1. Every message sent by a sender is received by a receiver and every received
message was sent by a sender in the system.
Axiom 2. Every message has an arbitrary but not infinite propagation delay.
Axiom 3. Every channel is a First In First Out (FIFO) channel. If process P sends
messages x and y to Q (in that order) then Q receives the messages in order (x then
y).
Reliable channels are often referred to as synchronous channels. In our system,
however, channels are not assumed to be perfectly reliable. Instead, we respect Axiom
3, partially fulfill Axiom 1, and disregard Axiom 2. Therefore, we assume the following
about communication channels in our systems (replacing Axiom 1):
Axiom 4. Every message received by a receiver was sent by a sender in the system.
Without the constrained propagation delay from Axiom 2, this type of com-
munication channel is typically referred to as an asynchronous channel. Additionally,
The communication model can be synchronous or asynchronous. In the synchronous
communication model, processes can only send a message when the receiving process
is ready to receive it. Algorithmically, sending in a synchronous model is usually
considered a “blocking” operation, meaning, once a process tries to send a message,
it cannot proceed until the message is received. In this work, communication is asyn-
chronous: a process does not wait for the successful delivery of a message, typically
referred to as a non-blocking send.
2.1.2 Clocks. Clocks are considered synchronized if every clock in the system
reads the same time. Since it is impossible for independent clocks to tick at the same
rate, weak synchronization is used to describe when clocks in the system have an
upper bound on drift rate from each other.
72.1.3 Execution. In a system with synchronous processes, processes execute
in lockstep. At each step, a process executes its next available action. Synchronous
execution requires the strong organization of the processes executing the algorithm.
The systems presented rely on partially synchronous execution by processes. In the
partially synchronous model, execution proceeds in rounds or phases. The start of
each round or phase is synchronized between processes, using a synchronized clock.
2.2 FAULTS, FAILURES, AND ERRORS
Processes can encounter incorrect behavior or issues during execution. Errors,
faults, and failures describe the severity and consequence of the issue.
Definition 1. An error is a difference between what is considered “correct” output for
a given component, and the actual output: an incorrect result.
Definition 2. A fault is the manifestation of an error in software or an incident where
an incorrect step or data definition is performed in a computer program.
Definition 3. A failure is the inability of a component or system to perform its re-
quired function or within its specified limits.
2.2.1 Crash Failure. A crash failure, or its more generalized form, a fail-
stop failure, describes a failure in which a process stops executing. In general, it is
considered to be an irreversible failure, since a process typically does not resume from
a crashed state. There is a special category of crash failures, called napping failures,
where a process will appear to have crashed for a finite amount of time before resuming
normal operation. Crash failures are impossible to detect with absolute certainty in
an asynchronous system[31]. Processes can be suspected of failure by other processes
through the use of challenge/response messages or heartbeat messages that allow a
process to prove that it has not crashed yet.
2.2.2 Failure Detectors. Failure detectors[13] (sometimes referred to as un-
reliable failure detectors) are a special class of processes in a distributed system used
to detect other failed processes. Distributed systems use failure detection to identify
8failed processes for leader election routines. Because it isn’t possible to directly detect
a failed process in an asynchronous system, there has been a wide breadth of work
related to different classifications of failure detectors with different properties. Some
of the properties include[13]:
• Strong Completeness - Every faulty process is eventually suspected by every
other working process.
• Weak Completeness - Every faulty process is eventually suspected by some other
working process.
• Strong Accuracy - No process is suspected before it fails.
• Weak Accuracy - There exists some process that is never suspected of failure.
• Eventual Strong Accuracy - There is an initial period where strong accuracy
is not kept. Eventually, working processes are identified as such, and are not
suspected unless they actually fail.
• Eventual Weak Accuracy - There is an initial period where weak accuracy is not
kept. Eventually, working processes are identified as such, and there is some
process that is never suspected of failing again.
One class of failure detectors, Omega class Failure detectors, are particularly
interesting because of Gomez-Calzado et al.[33]. In their work, the authors analyze a
leader-election with crash failures by determining the number of messages needed to
come to a consensus. An eventual weak failure (weak completeness and eventual weak
accuracy) detector is the weakest detector which can still solve consensus. Related
works note it in a number of ways: W [13], W [12] [14] and Ω (Omega) [33].
2.2.3 Omission Fault. An omission fault[19] occurs when a message is never
received by the intended recipient. Omission faults can occur when the communica-
tion medium is unavailable or when the latency of message exceeds a timeout for
its expected delivery. Protocols like TCP do not allow omission faults to propa-
gate beyond the transport layer: a packet is resent until it is acknowledged by the
9receiver[48]. If the acknowledgment never comes, the connection is closed. As a con-
trast, UDP assumes that any datagram could be lost, and it is the responsibility of
the programmer to handle missing datagrams appropriately. An omission failure can
have the same observable effects as a napping failure[31].
2.2.4 Byzantine Fault. A Byzantine fault causes processes in the distributed
system to send information that is incorrect or misleading to other processes. Con-
straints for detecting processes exhibiting Byzantine behavior are a famous result in
distributed systems[49].
2.3 PROBABILITY
Several concepts are useful for reasoning about the stochastic properties of a
distributed system. A random variable, typically denoted X or Y , is a variable whose
value is the outcome of a random event. The variable numerically represents possible
outcome of an event. Random variables may be discrete or continuous, depending
on the range of the possible outcomes of the random event it describes. A random
variable is discrete if its range is finite or countably infinite.
The expected value represents the long-term average output of a probability
distribution. If xi is a value the random variable X can produce, and pi is the
probability the random variable produces the value, the expected value, E[X], is:
E[X] = x1p1 + x2p2 + ...+ xkpk. (2.1)
Conceptually, the expected value is the weighted average of the outcomes of a stochas-
tic system.
Definition 4. Availability, denoted as A, is the probability a system or component is






Definition 5. Reliability is the ability of a system or component, in specified condi-
tions, to be able to perform its required functions for a specified period.
Let R(t) be the probability a system or component function up until at least
time t:




where f(x) is the probability density function for the component’s survival. Unfortu-
nately, there is a clash of the term for reliability in distributed systems and reliability
analysis. We try to constrain the discussion about reliability in the distributed sys-
tems sense to communication channels.
2.4 MARKOV MODELS
A Markov chain is a finite set of states X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} and probabilistic
transitions between those states. States in a Markov chain are mutually exclusive.
When a system is in some state xi, it has some probability of transitioning to some
other state xj at the next time-step. A Markov chain is a first order chain if the
probability of transitioning from i to j does not depend on the history of transitions
that lead to state i. First order chains are described as being memoryless because
they have the Markov property. The Markov property formalizes the independence
of the next state from the history of previous states. If we describe a Markov chain as
a sequence of random variables X1, X2, X3, ..., the Markov property states the value
of Xn+1 only depends Xn: [10]
Pr(Xn+1 = x | X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xn = xn)
= Pr(Xn+1 = x | Xn = xn). (2.4)
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An irreducible Markov chain is a chain where it is possible to go from any
state to any other state. A state is considered periodic with period k if returns to
a state must occur in nk steps (where n is a positive whole number and k ≥ 1). If
k = 1 a state is considered aperiodic. If every state is aperiodic, the Markov chain
is aperiodic. A state is recurrent if Pr(Xn = iforsomen ≥ 1|X0 = i) = 1. In an
irreducible chain, if any state is recurrent, every state is recurrent. A state is positive
recurrent if expected return time for the state is finite. A chain is positive recurrent
if every state is positive recurrent. A Markov chain is ergodic if it is aperiodic and
positive recurrent.
A stationary, or time homogeneous, Markov chain is one where the transition
probabilities do not change over time. In a stationary Markov chain, the nth visit to
a state is indistinguishable from the (n+ 1)th visit to a state.
2.4.1 Discrete Time Markov Chain. A Discrete Time Markov Chain
(DTMC) is one where the transitions between states happen at discrete time steps.
A DTMC with m states can be represented by an m×m matrix. For simplicity when
creating the model, matrices in this work are 1-indexed. In a matrix P , the value
of Pij represents the probability of the transition from xi to xj. The matrix is row
stochastic, meaning the sum of each row in the matrix is equal to one:
m∑
i=1
Pij = 1. (2.5)
A useful companion to the transition matrix is a state distribution vector. While
the transition matrix describes how a system will transition between states, the state
distribution vector describes the probability of observing a given state.
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If every Pij is positive and non-zero, the DTMC is said to be positive regular.
Every positive regular Markov chain is ergodic[39]. As a consequence every regular
Markov is periodic and positive recurrent.
Definition 6. A state distribution vector is an m-dimensional vector composed of the
probability of observing each state in the system at a given instant.
Let v be a state distribution vector:
v = [P1 P2 . . . Pm]
where Pi corresponds to the probability of observing state xi.
A DTMC is a suitable model for a memoryless random process with a finite
number states which is observed at fixed time intervals. By utilizing a Markov chain, a
variety of statistical analyses can be performed on the modeled system. For example,
if a Markov chain is stationary, aperiodic, and positive recurrent it can be analyzed
for its steady state probabilities. The steady state is a state distribution vector that
describes the probability a random observation of a long-running process will observe
some state xi. The steady state probability distribution vector can by found via a
system of equations: [10]
0 ≤ pij ≤ 1.0 (2.6)
m∑
j=1





The computation of the steady state will be noted as Steady(). A Markov chain can
also be used to predict what state a process will be in at some point in the future.
Given an initial state and a number of time-steps, a matrix operation will yield the
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likelihood of the process being in each state after the time interval has passed. The
mean passage time, a measure of how many time-steps will pass before a process
returns or arrives in some state, can also be calculated.
We model a leader election algorithm with a closed-form representation of the
behavior of the algorithm. The closed-form representation is a profile Markov chain
(noted as P ) and will be validated against a chain generated from execution of the
algorithm. The chain constructed from sampled data is known as a test chain (noted
as T ).
2.4.2 Continuous Time Markov Chain. Transitions in a Continuous Time
Markov Chain (CTMC) depend on the amount of time spent in a given state. Let
X(s) = xi indicate the model is in state xi at time s. If the model is time homo-
geneous, then the probability of transitioning to state xj only depends on the time
spent in the current state (t).
Pr{X(s+ t) = xj|X(s) = xi} = Pr{X(t) = xj|X(0) = xi} (2.9)
Each transition has some expected value or holding time which describes the
amount of time before a transition occurs. The probability distribution function (pdf)
of the exponential distribution can be written as: [58]
f(x;λ) =

λe−λx x ≥ 0
0 x < 0
. (2.10)
As a result, the expected or mean value of an exponential distribution is a






When there are multiple possible transitions from a state, each with their own




λpx,y = λ(x) (2.12)
where λ(x, y) is the expected amount of time before state x transitions to state y.
The expected time in a state (λ(x)) is related to the expected time for an individual
transition (λ(x, y)) by a probability px,y. Each transition contributes to an expected
amount of time in the state.
2.4.3 Hidden Markov Model. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM), pictured
in Figure 2.1, is a Markov chain where the state is not directly visible to an observer[24].
Instead, the HMM outputs observations related to the underlying, hidden chain. The
hidden chain is assumed to meet the Markov property. A HMM can be described by
the notation λ = (Π, P, B), where Π is the initial state distribution vector, P is the
matrix of state transition probabilities, and B is a matrix describing the probability
of observing an output given the hidden state. Each row in B maps each state in X
to a probability distribution for an observation from Y . Let y be some observation,
where y ∈ Y , a finite set of discrete, possible observations. B then is a |X| × |Y |
matrix where Bij = Pr(Y = yj|X = xi), the probability of observing yj given the
system is in some hidden state xi. This relationship is pictured in Figure 2.2.
A model where the state is a combination of X and Y from a HMM is
also a Markov model. The state space for the new model, Z, is a set of tuples
Z = {(X0, Y0), (X0, Y1), ...(X1, Y0), ...(Xn, Ym)} where Pr(Zk + 1 = (xk+1, yk+1)|Zk =
(xk, yk)) = Pr(Yk+1 = yk+1|Xk+1 = xk+1) Pr(Xk+1 = xk+1|Xk = xk). Stated plainly,
the probability that the joint model is some state (xk+1, yk+1) is the probability that




Figure 2.1 Behavior of a hidden Markov model. The model goes through a sequence










Figure 2.2 Observable output of a hidden Markov model. Each hidden state (xi) has
a corresponding probability distribution (Bi) for the observable outputs (yj).
is yk+1. The probability distribution for the transition to the next state does not
depend on the yk of the current state.
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2.5 INFORMATION FLOW
A Kripke frame is a pair < W,R >[28] such that W is a set of possible worlds,
where each world corresponds to a unique global state of the system. Each element of
R describes a binary relationship for how the described system can move from world
to world as events occur in the described system.
In the case of a distributed system, a world could be described as one of the
possible combinations of values of all boolean state variables S = {s0, s1, ...sn} in
the system. As execution occurs, messages, time, or events cause these variables
to change. Each change in boolean variables corresponds to a relationship in R[52].
Therefore, a world w is one possible valuation of all the variables in S and a transition
from w to another w′ (with its own valuation) can be noted as wRw′. Without loss
of generality, each relationship in R must result in the change of at least one variable
in S. Additionally, the set of worlds is complete: every possible combination of state
variable values is represented in the set of worlds. No relationship in R can lead to a
world that does not exist.
Additionally, we can define a set of valuation functions, V. Each function
V isx(w) ∈ V describes the value observed by in a domain Di of a boolean state variable
sx in some world w. If a valuation function for a particular state variable is not defined
for an agent, the agent cannot determine the value of the state variable, and cannot
determine the value of any logical statement based on the variable. In the case of
a distributed system, the valuation function concept is analogous to the isolation of
memory for each agent. For example, an agent i cannot simply determine the value
of a variable for agent j.
The combination of a Kripke Frame < W,R > and a set of valuation functions
V is a Kripke model K = {W,R,V}, frequently known as a modal model. The
complete model describes all the possible worlds, the relation between those worlds
and the information available in the domains of the system.
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Let ϕ ∈ Φ0 be an atomic proposition in a set of countably many propositions.
The set of Well-formed formulas (wffs), as defined by the formulation rules in Table
2.1, is the least set containing Φ0. Additionally, we use the modal operator  as an
abbreviation for ¬♦¬ϕ. The complete axiomatic system is outlined in Table 2.2. For
the uninitiated, the modal box operator (), “it is necessary that,” states (in the case
of ϕ) “in every world w, ϕ is true.” As its dual, the diamond operator (♦) states
“there is a world where ϕ is true.”
2.5.1 Multiple Security Domain Model Non-Deducibility (MSDND).
In the domain of security, there are a wide variety of aspects worth protecting in every
system. These are grouped into the core security concepts of integrity, accessibility,
and privacy. Many traditional security approaches rely heavily on cryptography to
provide privacy. However, accidental information leakage can still occur, which com-
promises the privacy of the system. For CPS, the leakage is difficult to prevent.
Unlike their purely cyber counterparts, the actions taken by the physical components
cannot be easily hidden from an observer. For example, a plane changing altitude
or a car turning or changing speed cannot be hidden from an observer. More com-
plicated systems, like the power grid, have actions that are more difficult to observe.
However, a well-motivated attacker can potentially collect critical information about
the behavior of the cyber components with observations of the physical network[62].
Information flow security models are invaluable for assessing what informa-
tion, if any, is leaked by either the cyber of physical components of the CPS. Many
information flow security models, have been proposed, all based on similar concepts.
Typically, the models partition the system into two domains: the high-security do-
main and the low-security domain. However, the MSDND security model allows the
system to be partitioned into any number of domains. The MSDND model has been
used to describe how the Stuxnet attack was able to hide its malicious behavior from
the plant operators. The MSDND security model is expressed using modal logic to
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Table 2.1 The axiomatic system.
Definition of logical and modal operators (abbreviations)
D1. ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
D2. ϕ⊕ ψ ≡ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) (exclusive or)
D3. ϕ→ ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ
D4. ϕ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)
D5. ♦ψ ≡ ∃w ∈W : w ` ϕ
D6. ϕ ≡ ¬♦¬ϕ
D7. Biϕ agent i believes the truth of ϕ
D8. Ii,jϕ agent j informs i that ϕ ≡ >
D9. Ti,jϕ agent i trusts the report from j about ϕ
Axioms
P. All the tautologies from the propositional calculus.
K. (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
M. ϕ→ ϕ
A1. ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ
A2. ♦(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ ♦ϕ ∨ ♦ψ
A3. ϕ ∧ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)




I1. (Ii,jϕ ∧ Ii,j(ϕ→ ψ))→ Ii,jψ
I2. ¬Ii,j⊥
C1. (BiIi,jϕ ∧ Ti,jϕ)→ Biϕ
C2. Ti,jϕ ≡ BiTi,jϕ
Rules of Inference
R1. From ` ϕ and ` ϕ→ ψ infer ψ (Modus Ponens)
R2. ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) (DeMorgan’s)
R3. From ` ϕ infer ` ϕ (Generalization)
R4. From ` ϕ ≡ ψ infer ` ϕ ≡ ψ
R5. From ` ϕ ≡ ψ infer ` Ti,jϕ ≡ Ti,jψ
Table 2.2 Logical statement formulation rules.
1. if ϕ is a wff, so are ¬ϕ, ϕ, and ♦ϕ.
2. if ϕ is a wff, so are Biϕ and ¬Biϕ
3. if ϕ is a wff, so are Ti,jϕ and ¬Ti,jϕ
4. if ϕ is a wff, so are Ii,jϕ and ¬Ii,jϕ
5. if ϕ and ψ are both wff, so are ϕ ∧ ψ
6. if ϕ and ψ are both wff, so are ϕ ∨ ψ
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determine what information in a domain is deducible to an observer in another do-
main. The model exploits the possible worlds of modal logic to determine if there are
worlds where the value of a logical atom is deducible by an agent outside the domain.
As a consequence, it can be used to determine what an agent in a distributed system
can determine about another agent. The exact specification of timing the distributed
system becomes unnecessary as the modal model can express any combination of
logical atoms in one of its worlds.[37][26][38]
The MSDND security model can be expressed as follows[26]: Consider a pair
of state variables sx and sy which may or may not be in the same security domain.
The value of sx and sy have a logical xor relationship: if sx is true, sy must be false.
Given an agent i that does not have a valuation function for either of those two
variables, the system is MSDND secure for the agent and pair of variables. Written
formally:
MSDND = ∃w ∈ W : w ` [(sx ∨ sy) ∧ ¬(sx ∧ sy)]
∧[w  (6 ∃V ix(w)∧ 6 ∃V iy (w))] (2.13)
Of particular interest is the special case where sx and sy are relation on the same wff:
(sx = ϕ and sy = ¬ϕ):
MSDND = ∃w ∈ W : w ` [ϕ⊕ ¬ϕ]
∧[w  ( 6 ∃V iϕ(w))] (2.14)
In a system where the above logical relationship holds, the agent i cannot determine
the value of sx or sy. However, if the relationship does not hold, there is some world
where the agent can determine the value of sx and sy.
2.5.2 BIT Logic. Belief, Information transfer, Trust (BIT) was developed
to formalize logic about belief and information transfer. BIT logic has typically
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been applied to distributed systems but has also played roles in CPS security. The
operations of the BIT logic allow formal definition of how entities pass information,
and how they will act on the information passed to them. BIT logic utilizes several
modal operators:
• Ii,jϕ defines the transfer of information directly from agent j to an agent i.
• Ti,jϕ defines trust an agent i has in a report from j that ϕ is true.
• Biϕ defines the belief that an agent i has about ϕ. The actual value of ϕ is
irrelevant: the agent i believes it to be true.
These operators allow reasoning about information transfer between entities.
In the context of a distributed system, these operators allow the division of the actual
state held by some agent i to what some other agent j believes is agent i’s state.
2.6 EXPLICIT CONGESTION NOTIFICATION AND RANDOM EARLY
DETECTION
ECN is a technique for managing congestion in IP networks. When an ECN-
capable network device detects congestion, it can drop the packets, or it can signal
senders using flags in the packet headers that the network is congested. For a TCP
application, the result of the dropped packets causes the slow-start congestion control
strategy to reduce the rate packets are sent. A more advanced implementation, using
ECN, sets specific bits in the TCP header to indicate congestion. By using ECN,
TCP connections can reduce their transmission rate without re-transmitting packets.
UDP applications have not typically utilized ECN. Although the ECN stan-
dard has flags in the IPv4 header, access to the IPv4 header is not possible on most
systems. Furthermore, there is not a “one size fits all” solution to congestion in UDP
algorithms.
The RED queuing algorithm is a popular algorithm for switches and routers. It
uses a probabilistic model and an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
to determine if the average queue size exceeds predefined values. The values are
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used to identify potential congestion and manage it. Congestion identification is
accomplished by determining the average size of the queue, and then probabilistically
dropping packets to maintain the size of the queue. In RED, when the average queue
size, avg, exceeds a minimum threshold (minth), but is less than a maximum threshold
(maxth), new packets arriving at the queue may be “marked”. A packet is marked
based on the following relation between pb and pa:
pb = maxp(avg −minth)/(maxth −minth) (2.15)
pa = pb/(1− count ∗ pb) (2.16)
where pa is the final probability a packet will be marked, maxp is the maximum
probability a packet will be marked when the queue size is between minth, and maxth
and count is the number of packets since the last marked packet. With RED, the
probability a packet is marked varies linearly with the average queue size and as a
function of the time since the last packet was marked. If avg is greater than maxth,
the probability of marking trends toward one as the average queue size approaches
2 ∗ maxth. In the event the queue fills completely, the RED queue operates as a
drop-tail queue. In a simple implementation of the RED algorithm, marked packets
are dropped.
2.7 DISTRIBUTED GRID INTELLIGENCE (DGI)
The DGI is a smart-grid operating system that organizes and coordinates
power electronics. It also negotiates contracts to deliver power to devices and regions
that cannot effectively facilitate their own needs. DGI leverages common distributed
algorithms to control the power grid, making it an attractive target for modeling a
distributed system. Algorithms employed by the DGI and grouped into modules work
together to migrate power from areas of excess supply to excess demand.
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DGI utilizes several modules to manage a distributed smart-grid system. Group
management, which is our main focus, implements a leader election algorithm to dis-
cover which processes are reachable within the cyber domain. Other modules provide
additional functionality, such as collecting global snapshots, negotiating the migra-
tions, and giving commands to physical components.
DGI is a real-time system; certain actions (and reactions) involving power
system components need to be completed within a pre-specified time frame to keep
the system stable. It uses a round robin schedule where each module is given a
predetermined window of execution which it may use to perform its duties. When a
module’s round ends, the next module in the line is allowed to execute.
The DGI uses the leader election algorithm, “Invitation Election Algorithm,”
written by Garcia-Molina[30]. The algorithm provides a robust election procedure
which allows for transient partitions. Transient partitions are formed when a faulty
link inside a group of processes causes the group to divide temporarily. When the
link becomes more reliable, the transient partitions merge.
2.7.1 Real Time. Real-time requirements were designed to enforce a strict
upper bound on the amount of time used creating groups, discovering peers, collecting
the global state, and performing migrations.
To enforce these bounds, the real-time DGI has distinct phases which modules
were allowed to use for all processing. Each module was given a round with a specific
amount of processor time allocated to the module. Modules used the allocated time to
complete any tasks they had prepared. When the allotted time was up, the scheduler
changed context to the next module. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Modules informed the scheduler of tasks they wish to perform. The tasks could
be scheduled for some point in the future, or scheduled to be executed immediately.

































Figure 2.3 Real time scheduler. The real time scheduler used a round robin
approach to allot execution time to modules. 1© Modules requested a task be
executed by specifying a time in the future to execute the task. 2© A timer was set
to count down to the specified moment. Modules could place tasks immediately into
the ready queue if the task could be executed immediately. 3© When the timer
expires, the task is placed into the ready queue. 4© Modules were assigned periods
of execution (called phases) of a predetermined length. After the specified amount
of time had passed, the module’s phase ends and the next module in the schedule
began to execute. 5© The worker selected the next ready task for the active module
from the ready queue and executed it. These tasks could also schedule other tasks
to be run in the future.
When the module’s phase was active, tasks were pulled from the ready queue
and executed. When the phase was complete, the scheduler stopped pulling tasks
from the previous module’s queue and began pulling from the next module’s queue.
Using a round robin scheduler allowed enforcement of an upper bound on message
delay.
2.7.2 Group Management Algorithm. The DGI uses the leader election
algorithm, “Invitation Election Algorithm,” written by Garcia-Molina[30]. Originally
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published in 1982, the algorithm provides a robust election procedure that allows for
transient partitions. Transient partitions are formed when a faulty link between two
or more clusters of DGI causes the groups to divide temporarily. These transient
partitions merge when the link becomes more reliable. The election algorithm allows
for failures that disconnect two distinct sub-networks. These sub-networks are fully
connected, but connectivity between the two sub-networks is limited by an unreliable
link.
Since Garcia-Molina’s original publication[30], a large number of election al-
gorithms have been created. Each algorithm is designed to be well-suited the problem
space where it is used. Specialized algorithms exist for wireless sensor networks[66][22],
detecting failures in certain circumstances[69][54], and of course, transient partitions.
Work on leader elections has been incorporated into a variety of distributed frame-
works: Isis[11], Horus[61], Totem[55], Transis[5], and Spread[4] all have methods for
creating groups. Despite the broad range of work, the fundamentals of leader election
are consistent across all work. Processes arrive at a consensus of a single peer that
coordinates the group. Processes that fail are detected and removed from the group.
The elected leader is responsible for making work assignments and identifying
and merging with other coordinators when they are found, as well as maintaining an
up-to-date list of peers for the members of its group. Group members monitor the
group leader by periodically checking if the group leader is still alive by sending a
message. If the leader fails to respond, the querying process will enter a recovery state
and operate alone until they can identify another coordinator. Therefore, a leader
and each of the members maintains a set of processes which are currently reachable,
a subset of all known processes in the system.
Leader election can also be classified as a failure detector[33]. Failure detectors
are algorithms which detect the failure of processes within a system; they maintain a
list of processes that they suspect have crashed. This informal description gives the
25
failure detector strong ties to the leader election process. The group management
module maintains a list of suspected processes which can be determined from the set
of all processes and the current membership.
The leader and the members have separate roles to play in the failure detection
process. Leaders use a periodic search to locate other leaders to merge groups. This
query also serves to detect failures within the system. The member sends a query to
its leader. The member will only suspect the leader and not the other processes in
their group.
Using a leader election algorithm allows the FREEDM system to autonomously
reconfigure in the event of a failure. Cyber components are tightly coupled with the
physical components, and their reaction to faults is not limited to faults originating
in the cyber domain. Processes automatically react to crash-stop failures, network
issues, and power system faults. The automatic reconfiguration allows processes to
react immediately to issues, faster than a human operator, without relying on a
central configuration point. However, it is important that the configuration a leader
election algorithm supplies is one where the system can do viable work without causing
physical faults like voltage collapse or blackouts[16].
A state machine for the election portion of the election algorithm is shown
in Figure 2.4. In the normal state, the election algorithm regularly searches for
other coordinators. When another coordinator is identified, all other processes will
yield to their future coordinator. The method of selecting which process becomes
the coordinator of the new group differentiates the modified algorithm from other
approaches.
2.7.3 Power Management. We utilized the load balancing algorithm from
[3]. The load balancing algorithm performs work by managing power devices with
a sequence of migrations[68]. In each migration, a sequence of message exchanges
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Figure 2.4 State machine for an election. Processes start as coordinators in the
“Normal” state and search for other coordinators to join with. Processes
immediately respond to AYC messages they receive. The algorithm was modified by
adding a “Ready Acknowledgment” message as the final step of completing the
election. Additionally, processes only accept invites if they have received an “AYC
Response” message from the inviting process.
and other processes supply them with power by utilizing a shared bus. First, processes
that cannot meet their demand announce their need to all other processes. Processes
with devices that exceed their demand offer their power to processes that announced
their need. These processes perform a three-way handshake. At the end of the
handshake, the two processes have issued commands to their attached devices to
supply power from the shared bus and to draw power from the shared bus. An
example of how the power system is affected by migrations is depicted in Figure 2.5.
In the chart, processes with net power generation (generation > 0) share power with
processes with excess loads. As processes with excess loads are satisfied, both supply
and demand processes trend toward 0 net generation.
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Net Generation over Time (No Traffic)
Figure 2.5 Effects of migrations on power. Each migration consumes excess
generation capability and removes excess demand.
The DGI algorithms can tolerate packet loss and is implemented using UDP
to pass messages between DGI processes. Effects of packet loss on the DGI’s group
management module have been explored in [40] and [41]. The load balancing algo-
rithm can tolerate some message loss, but lost messages can cause migrations to only
partially complete, which can cause instability in the physical network. A failed mi-
gration is diagrammed in Figures 2.6 and 2.7. With the power migration algorithm,
uncompensated actions may occur in the power system. These actions can eventu-
ally lead to power instability through issues such as voltage collapse. Additionally,
the supply process may not always be certain if the second half of the action was
completed or not. If the “Draft Accept” message does not arrive from the demand
process, the supply process cannot be certain if its “Draft Select” message was re-
ceived. If the supply process takes action to compensate by reversing the migration
and the confirmation arrives later, the system will also be driven towards instability
because another process completed an uncompensated action. These failed migrations
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drive the system towards physical instability. It is, therefore, desirable to manage the











Figure 2.6 Example of a failed migration. (*) and (**) mark moments when power
devices change state to complete the physical component of the migration. In this
scenario, the message confirming the demand side made its corresponding physical










Figure 2.7 Example of a failed migration. (*) marks a moment when power devices
change state to complete the physical component of the migration. In this scenario,
the supply process changes its device state, but the demand process does not.
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3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION
The entry point to research in this area was asking the question: “How does
the software managing critical infrastructure, like FREEDM, behave when a critical
component, the communication infrastructure, is not operating correctly?” Histori-
cally, leader elections have had limited applications in critical systems. However, in
the smart-grid domain, there is a great opportunity to apply leader election algo-
rithms in a directly beneficial way. [3] presents a simple scheme for performing power
distribution and stabilization that relies on formed groups. Algorithms like Incre-
mental Consensus Algorithm[73], begin with the assumption that there is a group of
processes who coordinate to distribute power. In a system where 100% up time is not
guaranteed, leader elections are a promising method of establishing these groups. A
strong cyber-physical system should be able to survive and adapt to network outages
in both the physical and cyber domains. When one of these outages occurs, the phys-
ical or cyber components must take corrective action to allow the rest of the network
to continue operating normally.
This work observes the effects of message omission on the group management
module of the Distributed Grid Intelligence (DGI) used by the FREEDM smart-grid
project. This system uses a broker system architecture to coordinate several software
modules that form a control system for a smart power grid. These modules include:
group management, which handles coordinating processes via leader election; state
collection, a module which captures a global system state; and load balancing, which
uses the captured global state to bring the system to a stable state.
It is important for the designer of a cyber-physical system to consider what
effects the cyber components will have on the overall system. Failures in the cyber
domain can lead to critical instabilities which bring down the entire system if not
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handled properly. In fact, there is a major shortage of work within the realm of the
effects cyber outages have on CPS[67][71]. The analysis presented in this work focuses
on quantifiable changes in the amount of time a DGI could spend participating in
energy management with other processes.
Using the DGI as a starting point, the analysis of the leader election algorithm
in the DGI began with analysis of its behavior when messages were lost. To do this,
the DGI software was subjected to omission faults while the state of the algorithm
was captured over a period of examination. The goal of these experiments was to
examine what behavior the DGI would exhibit during the fault conditions. Addi-
tionally, we hoped to determine the advantages and disadvantages of using a more
complicated, reliable message retransmission protocol over a more simple one without
retransmission.
3.1 INITIAL EXPERIMENTS
The initial experiments were collected from a non-real time version of the
DGI code. Experiments measured the in group time (IGT), a measure of availabil-
ity, for various sets of DGI running the leader election algorithm during omission
fault conditions. Additionally, the experiments examined two communication modes,
the Sequenced Reliable Connection, and the Sequenced Unreliable Connection. Both
methods of communication were valid approaches for the message passing require-
ments of the DGI.
3.1.1 Sequenced Reliable Connection (SRC). The Sequenced Reliable
Connection (SRC) is a modified send and wait protocol with the ability to stop
resending messages and move on to the next one in the queue if the message delivery
time is too long. When designing this scheme we wanted to achieve several criteria:
• Messages must be accepted in order - Some distributed algorithms rely on the
assumption that the underlying message channel is FIFO.
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• Messages can become irrelevant - Some messages may only have a short period
in which they are worth sending. Outside of that time period, they should be
considered inconsequential and should be skipped. To achieve this, we have
added message expiration times. After a specified amount of time has passed,
the sender will no longer attempt to write that message to the channel. Instead,
it will proceed to the next unexpired message and attach a “kill” value to the
message being sent, with the number of the last message the sender knows the
receiver accepted.
• As much effort as possible should be applied to deliver a message while it is still
relevant.
There was one adjustable parameter, the resend time, which controls how
often the system would attempt to deliver a message it had not yet received an
acknowledgment for.
3.1.2 Sequenced Unreliable Connection (SUC). The Sequenced Unre-
liable Connection (SUC) protocol is simply a best effort protocol: it employs a sliding
window to try to deliver messages as quickly as possible. The receiver will look for
increasing sequence numbers and disregard any message that is of a lower sequence
number than is expected. The purpose of this protocol is to implement a bare mini-
mum: messages are accepted in the order they are sent.
Like the SRC protocol, the SUC protocol’s resend time can be adjusted. Addi-
tionally, the window size is configurable, but was left unchanged for the tests presented
in this work.
3.2 INITIAL RESULTS
The collected results from the tests were divided into several target scenarios
as well as the protocol used.
The first minute of each test in the experimental test was discarded so that
any transients in the test could be removed. The tests were run for ten minutes,
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however the maximum result was 9 minutes of IGT. These graphs first appeared in
[40].
3.2.1 Sequenced Reliable Connection, Two Process Case. The 100ms
resend SRC test with two processes was considered a type of control in this study.
These tests, pictured in Figure 3.1, highlighted the availability of the DGI with the
SRC protocol. The maximum IGT of 9 minutes was achieved with only 15% of
datagrams arriving at the receiver.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates that as the rate at which lost datagrams were re-sent
was decreased to 200ms, the in-group time decreased. This behavior was expected.
Each exchange had a time limit for each message to arrive and the number of attempts






















Two Process (SRC 100ms Resend)
























Two Process (SRC 200ms Resend)
Figure 3.2 IGT over a 10 minute run for a two process system with a 200ms resend
time.
3.2.2 Sequenced Reliable Connection, Transient Partition Case. The
transient partition case was a simple example in which a network partition separates
two groups of DGI processes. In the simplest case, where the opposite side of the
partition was unreachable, processes formed a group with the other processes on the
same side of the partition. Two processes were present on each side of the partition.
The 100ms case is shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
While messages could not cross the partition, the DGIs stay in a group with
the processes on the same side of the partition, leading to an in-group time of 9
minutes (the maximum value possible). As packets began to cross the partition
(as the omission probability decreased), DGI instances on either side attempted to
complete elections with the processes on the opposite partition and the in group
time began to decrease. During this time, however, the mean group size continued
to increase. Thus, while the elections were decreasing the amount of time that the
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module spent in a state where it can actively do work, it typically did not fall into
























Transient Partition (SRC - 100ms Resend)
Figure 3.3 Average size of formed groups for the transient partition case with a
100ms resend time.
The 200ms case (illustrated in Figures 3.5 and 3.6) suggests a similar behav-
ior to Figures 3.3 and 3.4, with a wider valley produced by the reduced number of
datagrams. The mean group size dipped below two in Figure 3.5, possibly because
longer resend times allowed for a greater number race conditions between potential
leaders. The race conditions are discussed during the SUC section since it was more























Transient Partition (SRC 100ms Resend)
























Transient Partition (SRC - 200ms Resend)
























Transient Partition (SRC 200ms Resend)
Figure 3.6 IGT over a 10 minute run for the transient partition case with a 200ms
resend time.
3.2.3 Sequenced Unreliable Connection, Two Process Case. The SUC
protocol’s experimental tests revealed an immediate problem. There was a general
increasing trend for the amount of IGT, shown in Figure 3.7. However, there was a
high amount of variance for every trial.
In the 200ms resend case (illustrated in Figure 3.8), a greater growth rate
occurred in the IGT as the omission probability decreased. When an average was
taken across all of the collected data points from the experiment, the average IGT
is higher for the 200ms case than it was for the 100ms case (6.86 minutes vs 6.09
minutes). There was a large amount of variance in the collected IGT, however. As
a result, it is not possible to state with confidence that the there is a significant























Two Process (SUC 100ms Resend)






















Two Process (SUC 200ms Resend)
Figure 3.8 IGT over a 10 minute run for two process system with 200ms resend time.
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3.3 MARKOV MODELS
After collecting the results from the initial experiments, we sought to describe
the observed behavior through the use of continuous-time Markov chains. The be-
havior of the DGI transition between various states of grouping was calibrated with
initial results and applied to other scenarios to validate the results. This approach had
several shortcomings. First, for reasons we will demonstrate in subsequent chapters,
the leader election algorithm modeled in these chains was not memoryless: the state
used in the Markov chain was not sufficient to capture the interaction between pro-
cesses that was occurring. Secondly, the continuous time model could not accurately
capture the execution model of the DGI. In the DGI, processes synchronize with each
other to execute in a partially-synchronous manner. As a result, the execution and
transition between states is more accurately described with a discrete-time Markov
chain.
The presented methodology of constructing the model was initially calibrated
against the original two-process case. This calibration used a non-real-time version
of the DGI code. The resulting Markov chain was processed using SharpE[46][63],
a popular tool for reliability analysis. SharpE measured the reward collected in 600
seconds, minus the reward that was collected in the first 60 seconds. Discarding
the reward from the first 60 seconds emulated the 60 seconds that were discarded in
the experimental runs. The SharpE results are plotted along with the experimental
results in Figures 3.9 and 3.10.
The race condition between processes during an election is a consideration in
the original leader election algorithm, and is an additional factor here. The simulator
provided a parameter to allow the operator to select how closely synchronized the
peers were. The synchronization parameter was the time difference between when
each process would search for leaders. The exchange of messages, particularly during






















Simulated versus Experimental In-Group Time:
Two Process (SUC 100ms Resend)
Experimental Value
SharpE Uptime
Figure 3.9 Comparison of in-group time as collected from the experimental platform





















Simulated versus Experimental In-Group Time:
Two Process (SUC 200ms Resend)
Experimental Value
SharpE Uptime
Figure 3.10 Comparison of in-group time as collected from the experimental
platform and the simulator (2 tick offset between processes).
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could synchronize even if they did not initially begin in a synchronized state. The
simulation results aligned best for the 100ms resend case with 1 tick (approximately
100ms difference in synchronization between processes) and 2 ticks (approximately
400ms) in the 200ms resend case.
The structure of the Markov Chain assumed that processes enter the election
state simultaneously. This was an appropriate assumption for the real-time system,
since the round-robin scheduler synchronized when processes ran their group man-
agement modules. The simulator was set to assume that the synchronization between
processes was very tight. New experimental data was collected for the 4 process, tran-
sient partition case. The collected data is overlaid with the results from the random






















Simulated versus Experimental In-Group Time:
Transient Partition (SUC 128ms Resend)
Experimental Value
Markov Value
Figure 3.11 Comparison of in-group time as collected from the experimental
























Simulated versus Experimental In-Group Time:
Transient Partition (SUC 64ms Resend)
Experimental Value
Markov Value
Figure 3.12 Comparison of in-group time as collected from the experimental
platform and the in-group time from the equivalent Markov chain (64ms between
resends).
As a measure of the strength of the model, the correlation between the pre-
dicted value was compared. The average error was also computed for each of the
samples taken. This information is presented in Table 3.1. These results were not
sufficient to accurately describe the behavior of the system during fault conditions.
As a result, we sought to refine the analysis of the model in order to get an accurate
portrayal of the behavior of the system during faults.
3.4 REMARKS
To ensure the critical infrastructure can safely and reliably provides services
to those needing the service, it is necessary to understand how the infrastructure
behaves during faults. Conceptually, using unvetted critical infrastructure, especially
when the infrastructure relies heavily on communication, is the same as stepping into
42




an elevator without a safety brake. Strong analysis of a system’s behavior during a
failure scenario is paramount to ensuring the safety of those using the infrastructure.
We propose knowledge of the correctness of the operation may be more impor-
tant than the efficiency of the operation of that critical infrastructure. Through this
work we demonstrate how distributed algorithms can be improved by reasoning about
them using information flow security models. Using these models, one can analyze
where the certainty of the system is placed as well as ensuring that the algorithms
can be modeled without complete and perfect information of the system.
The models created in this way allow a distributed critical infrastructure sys-
tem to adjust its behavior, hardening itself against failures. With this hardening
technique, the algorithms used by the system can prevent critical failures that could
decrease quality of life for the people using that system. Subsequent chapters show
how information flow methods can be used to determine the memorylessness of as-
pects of a distributed system, how those aspects can be used to construct a model,
and applications of those models.
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4 RELATED WORK
4.1 ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Dabrowski and Hunt’s work[20] focuses on examining the behavior of a collec-
tion of processes in a grid computing system processing a large dataset. In their work,
the authors use a DTMC to model a single process completing a task. The Markov
chain describes how a process in the system goes through the steps of acquiring a
task to work on, working on the task, and subsequently either completing or failing
the task. The created models are “absorbing” chains, meaning it has one or more
states the process cannot leave once it has arrived in those states. They consider the
Markov chain as a max-flow min-cut problem using the “task complete” and “task
failed” absorbing states as sinks. Their analysis uses minimal s-t cuts to determine
critical paths for the ideal operation of the system. By identifying “critical transi-
tions” in the graph, the edges that would most greatly affect the performance of the
system can be identified.
[33] studies an Omega class failure detector using OmNet++[17], a network
simulation software package. Instead of omission failures, however, it considers crash
failures. Each configuration goes through a predefined sequence of crash failures, and
OmNet++ is used to count the number of messages sent by each of three different
leader election algorithms. Additionally, [33] only considers the system to be in a
complete and active state when all participants have a consensus on a single leader.
Work by Halpern and Moses[35] shows that in a distributed system, when
there are omission faults, complete consensus cannot be achieved without access to
“common knowledge.” The authors use a logic system that isolates the atomic propo-
sitions (APs) a process can directly access to its memory space and a knowledge oper-
ator to access other APs when information is transferred between processes. It allows
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the authors to reason about the necessary conditions to arrive at consensus when
there are omission faults. They conclude consensus can only be reached when there is
existing shared knowledge in a system that is both unaffected by the omission faults
and is useful for arriving at a correct consensus. The authors establish, for the two
armies problem, the generals would only reach consensus and attack successfully if it
was common knowledge they would attack together. Additionally, they establish the
common knowledge of the two generals attacking together could not be established
in a system with omission faults.
4.2 PHYSICAL FAULTS CAUSED BY CYBER ENTITIES IN CPS
Faults in CPS can originate from many sources. First, and most obviously,
the traditional physical system being augmented by the CPS is subject to its own
failures, either from component failure or the actions of an attacker. Secondly, the
CPS must employ sensors to detect the state of the physical components in the
system. Like the physical components, these sensors are subject to component failure
or the actions of an attacker. Lastly, if the CPS communicates between entities using
a communication network, the network can be disrupted by any number of issues,
including DoS or congestion caused by other users in a shared network.
Several works have shown[62][16][67] that for a computer-controlled smart-
grid, failures originating at sensors or the communication network have the potential
to cause the cyber entities controlling the physical networks to take incorrect actions.
Approaches exist to identify faulty sensing components in a network, but the iden-
tification of bad sensing equipment may not always be possible. Additionally, it is
not always possible to identify if the origin of an issue is a faulty sensor or an outside
attacker.
If the cyber entity itself has been compromised, it could potentially exhibit
Byzantine behavior, causing it to try and trick other components into bad actions[62],
or it may try to disrupt the physical network directly. Work has been done to identify
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when an entity in a cyber network is actively working to compromise the physical
network by using the underlying physical invariants. However, even if a cyber entity is
trying to behave correctly, disruptions to the communication network or the sensors it
uses can cause it to take actions similar to a process actively attempting to destabilize
the system. Under the right circumstances, these actions can be identified by using
the underlying invariants of the physical network. Ideally, however, the best goal is
to avoid situations where a “good” entity is forced to act badly.
4.3 COMMUNICATION IN THE SMART-GRID
Communication in the smart-grid is still a rapidly developing area. In par-
ticular, because of the interest in the Internet of Things (IoT) and in Machine to
Machine (M2M) communication, there are a wide range of communication protocols
being developed for “smart” infrastructures like smart-cities, smart-factories, and the
smart-grid. Historically, for the power grid, communication has been unidirectional.
Because generation of power was centralized, communication requirements only ne-
cessitated communication paths between measurement points and control centers and
from the control centers to individual substations[27]. The Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used in the power grid were almost exclusively
organized in a star topology where the individual devices had no means of communi-
cating directly with each other.
In a smart-grid where power generation is widely distributed and citizens are
encouraged to manage their energy usage for their own economic benefit as well as
the planet’s, the traditional SCADA design is not sufficient[27][34][45]. This version
of the smart-grid relies heavily on communication between devices, consumers, and
the utility company to coordinate access to energy generated across a wide area. The
internet has potential as the backbone for these communication requirements. Due
to its prevalence, using existing internet infrastructure is an attractive, affordable
option for realizing the requirements of a smart-grid[53][34]. Many companies in the
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power generation industry have expressed an interest in using the internet in the
smart-grid[1].
Traditional SCADA systems for the power grid have used Distributed Network
Protocol 3 (DNP3), a data-link layer protocol, to control substations and related
devices[2]. For the smart-grid, IEC-61850 has emerged as a candidate for substa-
tion control[42][36][51]. IEC-61850 can be run over TCP/IP network or high speed
switched LANs[51].
A number of potential attacks on SCADA-based control systems have been
identified[70][7], including Denial of Service (DoS) attacks[50][43]. Regardless of the
communication medium or the source of the issue, handling interruptions to the
communication network in the smart-grid is an important concern. If a utility chooses
to use a public network like the internet for any portion of its control network, that
operator must consider the consequences of congestion on that network[25][29][72].
For congestion control in CPS, to our knowledge, only one other work has
advocated the ECN approach: [15]. In [15], the authors propose varying the sched-
ule and migration size of a load balancing-like algorithm in a network to maintain
physical network stability during congestion. We adapted their measure “K”, used to
determine when the system would collapse due to incomplete migrations, to evaluate
the success of our approach by counting the number of times migrations failed during
the simulation.
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5 INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTED
COMPUTING
A model created for a distributed system must have sufficient information to
be accurate. The current state of a distributed system is difficult to obtain because
memory spaces are typically isolated. Without exact synchronization, an accurate
global snapshot of the system cannot be taken. Instead of attempting to capture
exact global snapshots, our approach relies on allowing an agent to reason about the
state of the other agents in the system. By doing so, an agent can construct a model.
We propose the following for the execution environment of the distributed system:
• Each agent has some set of logical variables which it manipulates as its algo-
rithms execute.
• Each agent belongs to a domain unique to the agent (agent i is the only member
of the logical domain Di).
• No agent can directly access a variable outside its domain.
• The authenticity of any information transfer (using modal operator Ii,j) is al-
ways trusted. However, the trust operator (Ti,j) is used to describe a message
that is lost in transit: in all logical formulas presented, the trust operator de-
scribes the omission of a message.
• Agents do not exhibit Byzantine failure, nor do they crash; only messages may
be omitted.
If no information is passed between agents, they are MSDND secure (ignoring
any sort of leakage from interactions in the physical world). As information is passed,
aspects of the agent’s state are leaked. However, depending on when messages are
sent and which messages are lost, the agent can be left in doubt as to the state of the
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other agent. The two armies problem is a well-known thought experiment about the
ability of multiple parties to reach consensus when there are omission faults.
5.1 TWO ARMIES PROBLEM
First, we will show that information flow analysis can be used to determine
what state information is deducible to a particular agent in a system. We use the
common two armies problem as a starting point. Using the MSDND security model,
we will formally show which portions of the system state are leaked to an agent
through message exchanges.
In the two armies problem, two agents, which are generals of their respective
armies, must cooperate to attack an enemy city. However, the two armies are physi-
cally separated by the enemy city and must send messengers to coordinate their plan.
Any messenger the generals send can be captured by the enemy city, preventing their
message from being delivered. The attack will fail if the generals do not make an
agreement on when to attack. The generals must come to an agreement when their
channel for communication, a messenger, is unreliable.
After one message has been sent to one of the two generals, the state of the
intended recipient is MSDND secure to the sender. Let ϕ0 be an AP indicating
“General A will attack at dawn.”
Theorem 1. If no messages are exchanged, the state of the two generals is mutually
MSDND secure.
Proof. If no messages are exchanged and no information is leaked from the physical
world, the two generals have no way of determining the other’s state.
Theorem 2. Once at least one messenger delivers a message to one of the generals,
one of the generals is not MSDND secure.
Proof. Let {ϕi : i ∈ 1, 2...n} describe the state that a general has received ϕi−1.
Case 2.1. One messenger is sent by General A and arrives at General B.
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If no confirmations are sent, then General A clearly cannot deduce if General
B has received the message. To General A, General B is MSDND secure because
General A has no way to valuate BBϕ0. However, if B believes A’s message, then A
is not MSDND secure to B, because B believes that ϕ0 is true:
1. ϕ0 General A decides to attack at dawn.
2. IB,Aϕ0 General A sends a messenger to B informing them of their
army’s intent.
3. BBIB,Aϕ0 ∧ TB,Aϕ0 General B believes the message from general A.
4. BBϕ0 By C1.
5. BBϕ0 → ϕ1 General B knows the plan.
6. w  V Bϕ0(w) V Bϕ0(w) always returns true.
Therefore, A is not MSDND secure to B. However, V Aϕ1(w) 6∈ V , so B is secure to A.
Case 2.2. Any number of messengers are sent and deliver their messages, alternating
from General A or General B to the other general.
As each messenger arrives, the receiving general will trust the integrity of the
message and believe its contents, resulting in that general assigning value to ϕi. The
state of the receiving general remains secure to the sending general until a response
is delivered.
1. BBϕ0 Continuing from Case 2.1.
2. BBϕ0 → ϕ1 General B decides to follow A’s plan.
3. IA,Bϕ1 General B sends a messenger to A informing them of their
army’s intent.
4. BAIA,Bϕ1 ∧ TA,Bϕ1 General A believes the message from general B.
5. BAϕ1 By C1.
6. BAϕ1 → ϕ2 General A agrees.
... The same logical chain repeats.
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7. w  V xϕn(w) V xϕn(w) is always true. x is A or B depending on the
value of n.
Therefore, either A or B is not MSDND secure to the other for ϕn.
In the case n = 1, B is now unsure that A has received ϕ1 and cannot deduce
if BAϕ1. B is unsure of A’s state and, as a consequence, A is MSDND secure to B.
However, B is not MSDND secure to A because ϕ1 is known to A. By extension, for
i = 2, 4...n, B is secure to A, but not A to B. For i = 3, 5...n, A is secure to B, but
not B to A.
Theorem 3. If a messenger is captured and the message is not resent, both agents will
be secure on the last successfully delivered message ϕn or ϕ0 if the first messenger is
captured.
Proof. If a messenger carrying a reply is captured, original sender cannot determine
which message was captured.
Case 3.1. One messenger is sent and captured by the enemy.
If the messenger does not arrive, it is equivalent to the messenger never being
sent. (Theorem 1)
Case 3.2. If n − 1 messengers successfully deliver their message, but messenger n is
captured, both are secure on ϕn.
Suppose General A sends ϕn−1 to B. On the delivery of the message ϕn−1 to
B, the value of ϕn is secure in B to A, as A has no way of knowing if ϕn−1 was
delivered, unless B sends ϕn with a messenger. When B does send ϕn, the messenger
never arrives. As a consequence, General A has no way of assigning value to BAϕn
(V Aϕn 6∈ V). However, as before, ϕn−1 at A is not secure to B.
5.2 BYZANTINE GENERALS
If General A is attempting to coordinate with multiple armies, the problem
becomes more complex. If we extend the messenger analogy to cover faulty generals
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(ones sending incorrect information or omitting messengers), the generals can reach
consensus if, for every faulty general, there are three generals that work correctly.[49]
Theorem 4. In any message exchange that conforms to the constraints of the Byzan-
tine Generals problem, all agents are MSDND insecure on the plan ϕ.
Proof. Suppose agent i decides to use plan ϕ to attack and there is some set of
Byzantine generals T and some set of loyal generals G (i ∈ G). If |G| > 3|T |, the
algorithm executes successfully and Bxϕ : ∀x ∈ G. Therefore, every general in G can
valuate ϕ and the variable is insecure.
However, in a general omission model, the level of loyalty from processes may
be impractical to achieve. If the required number of “loyal” processes are not available,
the system cannot achieve consensus.
5.3 ELECTION IN AN ANONYMOUS COMPLETE NETWORK
Consider a version of the “coin-flipping” leader election[31] expressed in BIT
logic, presented as Algorithm 1. The algorithm is functionally identical, but con-
tains additional guards in the conditionals as an expression of the agents’ knowledge.
Additionally, note the construct of labeling each ϕ that an agent receives is simply
assigning labels to make the algorithm easier to understand. The algorithm only
considers the complete collection of ϕs for execution and not the source of any ϕ the
algorithm uses.
Let ψi be the state where an agent i completes the algorithm as the leader,
and γi as the state where an agent i has terminated the algorithm. The algorithm
terminates when {γi = T : ∀i} is satisfied and exactly one ψi is true (
∑
i ψi = 1).
Theorem 5. Algorithm 1 may not terminate correctly unless there is detectable, per-
fect information transfer to all parties in the algorithm.
Proof. Let i be the agent that would correctly terminate as the leader. Let j be a
process that has selected ϕj = F .
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1. ϕi = T, ϕj = F Initial conditions.
2a. Ij,iϕi i sends ϕi to j.
2b. Ii,jϕj j sends ϕj to i.
3a. ¬(BjIj,iϕi ∧ Tj,iϕj) j does not receive ϕi.
3b. BiIi,jϕj ∧ Ti,jϕi i receives ϕj.
4a. w 6 Vϕij(w) j cannot valuate ϕi.
4b. Biϕj By C1.
5a. 6 ∃V jϕi(w) ∧ ¬ϕj → (ϕ← T ) j Cannot determine that i can terminate and
incorrectly changes ϕ.
5b. ϕi ∧ w  V iϕj(w) ∧ ¬ϕj → ψi i incorrectly terminates as the leader.
Therefore, i will terminate before j decides to go passive. This result agrees with
results from similar analysis[21].
Algorithm 1 Anonymous Coin Flipping Leader Election Expressed in BIT logic
1: ϕi ← random(T, F )
2: ψi ← F
3: γi ← F
4: Send ϕi to every active neighbor (∀j 6= i : Ij , iϕi)
5: Receive ϕj from every active neighbor
6: if ϕi ∧ (∀j 6= i, w  V iϕj (w) : ¬ϕj) then
7: ψi ← T
8: γi ← T
9: else if (ϕi ∧ ∃j 6= i, w  V iϕj (ϕj)(w) : ϕj) ∨ (∀k s.t. w  V iϕk(w) : ¬ϕk then
10: ϕi ← random(T, F )
11: Go to next round
12: else if ∃j 6= i, w  V iϕj (w) : ϕj then
13: γi ← T
14: end if
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5.4 MODEL CONSTRUCTION FOR THE TWO ARMIES PROBLEM
Suppose for the two armies problem, A and B wish determine their chance
of success. If neither A nor B have any idea of the probability their messenger is
captured, they have no way of assessing their chances of a successful attack. However,
what can be determined if the two generals share some knowledge about the world?
Suppose that both generals know their messenger has the probability q = (1 − p) of
being captured in transit. When A sends a messenger to B, A will know there is a
probability p that the messenger arrives at B. If the messenger does indeed arrive
at B, B knows that A knows there is a p chance their attack will succeed. In this
situation, both generals can construct identical models of the success of the attack,
given the initial message arrives. It is also worth noting in this scenario, no additional
messages can improve the outlook of the two generals. Each additional message only
confirms there is a probability p the other general will also attack.
5.4.1 Generalization. The idea of converting a Kripke model to a Markov
model is mentioned in [44] and [65]. However, we could not locate a formal description
of the method, so we present one here: given a Kripke Model K =< W,R,V >,
where we obligate K to contain sufficient state information to ensure the probability
mapping is memoryless. Let fW : W → X be a bijective mapping from W to X, where
X is the set of states for a Markov model. Let fR be a mapping for a relationship
wRw′ ∈ R to Pr(Xi+1 = fW (w′)|Xi = fW (w)). Therefore, for a Kripke-Markov model
Pij = fR(w,w
′) where i = fW (w) and j = fW (w′).
For a process i, information about the system state is restricted to those APs
in its domain, Di. Let O : D ×X → Y be a surjective mapping from the complete,
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hidden system state to an observable state for a domain. With O, one can construct
B, the observation probability distribution matrix for a HMM:
Bij =

1, if O(Di, xi) = yj
0, otherwise.
(5.1)
Intuitively, one or more worlds will look identical to a process i, since the
information necessary to differentiate them is not in Di. As a side effect of O being
a deterministic, surjective mapping, a special case exists where the observed state
has the Markov property. Let v = {xi|O(Dx, xi) = a}, the set of hidden states that
produce the observation a. The observed state has the Markov property if:
Pr(Yk+1 = a|Yk = b) =
∑
v
Pr(Xk+1 = xi|Xk = xj),∀xj ∈ {xj|O(Dx, xj) = b}. (5.2)
The observed probability of going from Yk to Yk+1 is the probability that the
hidden state Xk transitions to a state Xk+1 such that the observation for Xk+1 is
Yk+1. It must also hold that the observed probability does not depend on the hidden
state: any Xk that results in an observation Yk must have the same probability of
transitioning to Yk+1 as the other Xks that yield the same observation.
5.4.2 State Determination. When an agent uses the information transfer
operator (Ii,j) to pass information to another agent in the system, it intends for that
agent to believe the passed wff. When an agent distributes a wff to many agents with
the information transfer operator, it leads to a set of beliefs about the beliefs of the
receiving agents. The set, Ni, is the set of beliefs agent i can have if all the wff it
passed to the other agents are believed. For example, if an agent distributes a wff ϕ
to a set of agents Ag (i 6∈ Ag), then Ni = {BiBjϕ : ∀j ∈ Ag}. Since the belief of
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each Bjϕ is outside of the domain Di, the agent i can only valuate a wff in Ni which
has been leaked to i.
Let the set Li be the subset of Ni for which a valuation function exists in a
domain i. Li can be populated either by direct information transfer or information
leakage from interactions with agents. We can similarly define a set Mi which is the
subset of Ni and superset of Li. The values in Mi correspond to the beliefs of agent
i if i had perfect knowledge of the beliefs other agents (Li ⊆Mi ⊆ Ni).
Theorem 6. Each member of Li is MSDND insecure to i.
Proof. Each wff in Li has a valuation function in the domain i.
1. Ij,iϕ i informs some agent j of ϕ.
2. BjIj,iϕ ∧ Tj,iϕ j receives ϕ and believes its authenticity.
3 Bjϕ By C1.
4. Ii,jϕack j acknowledges Bjϕ.
5. BiIj,iϕack ∧ Ti,jϕack i receives ϕack.
6. Biϕack By C1.
7. Biϕack → BiBjϕ Because j acknowledged ϕ, i believes j believes ϕ.
8. w  V iBiBjϕ(w) i does believe ϕ.
9. w  V jBjϕ(w) Is always true.
Therefore, j ∈ Li, and Bjϕ is MSDND insecure to i.
Theorem 7. Each wff in Mi and Ni but not Li is MSDND secure to i.
Proof. Each wff in Mi and Ni but not Li have no valuation in the domain i.
Case 7.1. The case where j receives some wff ϕ and is in Mi but not Li.
1. Ij,iϕ i informs some agent j of ϕ.
2. BjIj,iϕ ∧ Tj,iϕ j receives ϕ and believes its authenticity.
3 Bjϕ By C1.
4. Ii,jϕack j acknowledges Bjϕ.
5. ¬(BiIj,iϕack ∧ Ti,jϕack) i does not receive ϕack.
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6. w¬  V iϕack(w) i is uncertain if Bjϕ.
7. w  V jϕ (w) Is always true.
Therefore, j ∈ Mi, and Bjϕ is MSDND secure to i. As a consequence of step 5, j is
not in Li.
Case 7.2. The case where j does not receive some wff ϕ and is in Ni but not Mi.
1. Ij,iϕ i informs some agent j of ϕ.
2. ¬(BjIj,iϕ ∧ Tj,iϕ) j does not receive ϕ.
3. w 6 V iBjϕ(w) i is uncertain if Bjϕ.
4. w 6 V jϕ (w) j is uncertain of ϕ.
Therefore, j ∈ Ni, and Bjϕ is MSDND secure to i.We assumed any beliefs an agent
held stem from information transfer from another agent. Therefore, we can assert the
beliefs in Li for any process i must have a traceable history derived from a process
having a valuation for the referenced wff that aligns with the belief process i holds
about the wff. Furthermore, wff in Ni but not Li do not have valuation in domain
Di and cannot be used in an observation.
57
6 ALGORITHM AND MODEL CREATION
In order for the leader election algorithm to be analyzed with Markov chains,
the algorithm was modified from its original form. These modifications allowed the
observations of the highest priority process to be a DTMC. In this chapter, the mod-
ifications to the algorithm are presented, along with the reasoning for those changes,
motivated by the MSDND analysis presented previously. The probability of transi-
tioning between states is presented as a formula and the accuracy of the formula is
validated using a statistical inference test.
6.1 ORIGINAL INVITATION ELECTION ALGORITHM OVERVIEW
A state machine for the election portion of the invitation-election algorithm
is shown in Figure 2.4. In the normal state, the election algorithm regularly searches
for other coordinators to join. When another coordinator is identified, the identify-
ing coordinator will attempt to invite the other coordinator to their group. In the
invitation election algorithm, processes are assigned a priority based on their process
ID. The coordinator with the highest priority is the first to send invites. After a
brief delay, if it appears that coordinator did not send their invites, the next highest
process will send their invites. If a coordinator accepts an invitation, it will forward
the invite to its group members. Processes that receive an invite that are not already
in an election will accept the invite. Once a timeout expires, the coordinator will send
a “ready” message with a list of peers to all processes that accepted the invite. The
invited processes have timeouts for when they expect the ready message to arrive. If
the message does not arrive in time, the process will enter the recovery state where
it resets to a group with itself as the only member.
Once a group is formed it must be maintained. To do this, processes occa-
sionally exchange messages to verify the other is still reachable. The interaction is
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shown in Figure 6.1. Coordinators send “Are You Coordinator” messages to members
of its group to check if the process has left the group. Group members send “Are
You There” messages to the coordinator to verify they haven’t been removed from
the group and to ensure the coordinator is still alive. If processes fail to reply to a
received message before a timeout, they will leave the group. Leaving the group can
initiated by the coordinator removing the process, or the process can enter a recovery


































Figure 6.1 State machine for maintaining a group. The AYC messages are the same
as those in Figure 2.4. AYC and AYT are periodically sent by processes, and
responses to those messages are immediately sent by the receiving process. In the
modified algorithm, the member does not enter the recovery state if they do not
receive an AYT response before the timeout expires.
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6.2 EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT
Execution occurred in a real-time, partially synchronous environment. The
execution environment was subject to omission failures. Processes synchronized their
clocks and executed steps of the election algorithm at predefined intervals. Processes
with clocks that were not sufficiently synchronized could not form groups. For this
work, process execution occurred in an environment where the clocks were sufficiently
synchronized to consistently form groups. In the real-time environment, messages
that were delayed and missed their real-time deadlines had the same appearance as
an omitted message. The execution environment for the election algorithm had an
omission fault occurrence modeled as a Bernoulli trial. In this model, each message
had some probability p of being delivered within the timing constraints imposed by
the real-time schedule. For the purpose of analyzing the effects of omission failures,
processes were not subject to other faults.
6.3 MODEL CONSTRUCTION
A process can construct a Markov chain if its observations are consistent with
the transition probabilities the process can determine with its observable state. In
each election, a process has some probability of joining a given process’ group. Let
Pr(i → j), be the probability the outcome of an election is i being a member of j’s
group. Since every process must be a member of some group:
∑
j
Pr(i→ j) = 1. (6.1)
Let Pr(i→ j|i ∈ k) be the probability i joins j at the end of an election given i starts
in k’s group at the start of the election. A similar relationship to Equation 6.1 must
exist for this circumstance:
∑
j
Pr(i→ j|i ∈ k) = 1. (6.2)
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A leader process j can construct a Markov chain iff, for every i that can join j’s
group:
Pr(i→ j|i ∈ k) = Pr(i→ j), i 6= j 6= k (6.3)
where i ∈ k is a state where i is in k’s group. Therefore, the probability of i joining j’s
group must be independent of i’s membership at the start of the election. Equation
6.3 enforces the probability j observes some process i joining its group is independent
of i’s previous membership, which is hidden to j unless i was in j’s group. From
Equations 6.1 and 6.2:
∑
n6=j




If more than one process can create a Markov chain, an algorithm which
allows for that circumstance will have undesirable behavior. Suppose there are three
processes A, B, and C. Without loss of generality, assume C is in A’s group. For B
to be able to construct a Markov chain, it must be equally likely that C leaves A’s
group to join B’s as it is likely C would join B given it was not in A’s group. In a
system with no omission faults, ideally, a process will join a group and never leave it,
especially if the election algorithm is being used to find a consensus value. Therefore,
we restrict model construction to the highest priority process.
6.4 MODIFIED ELECTION ALGORITHM
The complete, modified election algorithm is listed in the appendix.
6.4.1 State Determination. In the Garcia-Molina version of the algorithm,
processes distribute a list of processes that have accepted their invite. Let i be
the coordinator of a group distributing ready messages. The process i has a list of
processes who have accepted its invite. Let ϕx be a wff indicating some process x is
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part of i’s group. Let G = {ϕx|x ∈ AcceptedInvite} ∪ {ϕi} be the set of processes
that have accepted i’s invite. To finalize the group, i will distribute G to each process
described in G. If a processes does not receive G it will not be in the group.
Theorem 8. In the original algorithm, each process is MSDND secure on ϕx for each
x that is not i or itself (j).
Proof. The receipt of G by other members of a group is secure to a process that
receives G.
Case 8.1. The case where x = i or x = j.
If we assume the authenticity of messages is not questioned in this environ-
ment, a ready message from i must mean i is a part of the group. Therefore, i’s
inclusion in the group is MSDND insecure to j.
If j accepts the ready message, that process will be a part of the group in G
and since j knows its own state, j knows it is a part of G.
Case 8.2. The case where x 6= i and x 6= j.
For process i, i distributes G to each other process in G. Let Q be some set
of processes that do not receive the G set.
1. Ij,iG∀j ∈ G i distributes the list of processes that have ac-
cepted the invite.
2. ¬(BxIx,iG ∧ Tx,iG)∀x ∈ Q Processes in Q do not receive G.
3. BxIx,iG ∧ Tx,iG∀x 6∈ Q Processes not in Q receive G.
4. w 6 V jBxG(w)∀{x|x 6∈ {i, j}} j does not know which processes received G
Therefore, the receipt of G by other members of the group is MSDND secure to j.
Corollary 9. The set of processes in the ready message is an Ni set, where i the
group’s coordinator.
Because every wff in G is MSDND secure, G must be an Ni set, and Li = ∅.
As a consequence, the group leader only has an estimate of the system, which may
be an overestimate (Mi ⊆ Ni).
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With a ready acknowledgment message from members of the group, the leader
can construct an Li set, which underestimates the state of the system. From the
previous chapter, we have shown that with message passing and omission, at least
one process is left insecure to the other.
Theorem 10. If a process j sends a ready acknowledgment message to i, j’s inclusion
in the i’s view of the system state is MSDND secure to j.
Proof. When j sends the ready acknowledgment message to i, it is uncertain if the
acknowledgment message is actually delivered. From Theorem 2.1, we know that j
is now MSDND insecure to i, but i is secure to j. Using the ready acknowledgment
messages, i can then valuate BiBjϕj for every j sending an acknowledgment.
Once the ready acknowledgment messages have been sent to the leader, the
group can begin to interact. As it is impossible for the members of the group to be
distributed the Li set, they must operate using the Ni set they received from the
coordinator. Messages from other processes which could only have been sent if they
are a part of the Mi set can leak to the receiving processes their receipt of the G
set from i. For the purpose of model construction, the determination of members of
Mi that are not in Li may be undesirable for a DTMC since it may involve changing
the state captured for the chain at the incorrect moment. Instead, for simplicity,
while the leader can update their Li set with leaked information, we avoid doing so
to preserve the memorylessness property in the following sections.
6.4.2 Memorylessness. A process can update Li with leaked information.
To ensure the memorylessness property, we are particularly interested in the situation
where a process receives the ready message, but the acknowledgment is lost, meaning
the process is not included in the Li set. We wish to ensure that the process can
determine its own exclusion in Li so it can behave as though it is not in Mi. To do
this, we attach an additional field to the AYC message to indicate if the coordinator i
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considers the receiving process j a part of the Li set. The receiving process can infer
it is not part of Li and it should behave accordingly.
Likewise, for the coordinator, an AYT message leaks that the sending process
is a part of the Mi set if it is not in Li. Since the behavior of the process in Mi is
defined to behave as though it was not in Li, the coordinator should do the same. This
should be the case even if the process sending AYT has already responded negatively
to an AYC from i. For the purpose of memorylessness, i should consider j to have
responded in the affirmative.
Processes determine which invitation to accept based on the exchange of the
AYC messages. Processes wish to be in a group led by the coordinator with the
highest priority. Processes will submit AYC messages to higher priority processes
that are not its coordinator, even if they are in a group. As a result, the processes
will always seek highest priority, regardless of their current group. More importantly,
this releases the process from obligations on its next state from the state of other
processes in the system. A process will only accept a received invitation if it has
determined the sending process is the highest priority process.
In Figure 6.2, we diagram the sequence of message exchanges and function
calls for two possible states for a process not in the leader’s group. In the first
state, the process nearly completed an election the previous round, but the ready
acknowledgement message was not delivered in time, resulting in the process being in
the Mi set. In the second state, the process is not in the leader’s group. Both cases
require the same number of messages to be delivered for the process to be considered
a part of the group.
Therefore, regardless of the hidden state of the system, the highest priority
process’ observations will produce a Markov chain. The probability of transitioning
to the next state is not influenced by the interactions of the other processes: it only























(Partially Failed Previous Election)
Figure 6.2 Diagram of message exchanges for an election. Process 2 almost
completed the previous election and considers itself a part of process 1’s group, but
process 1 does not. Process 3 does not consider itself a part of process 1’s group
before the election begins. Both process 2 and process 3 need to successfully
exchange the same number of messages to successfully complete the election.
Theorem 11. The observations of the highest priority process are sufficient for pro-
ducing a Markov chain from the underlying HMM.
Proof. The state the highest priority process observes always has the same transition
probabilities, regardless of the hidden state of the other processes.
Case 11.1. The system has one other process (n = 1).
If there is only one other process, the probability of observing a group of two
processes given the current state is a direct observation.
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Case 11.2. The system has two other processes (n = 2).
In this case, there are 3 possible states for each of the other processes to be
in: grouped with the highest priority process, ungrouped, and grouped without the
highest priority process. When the other processes are grouped with the highest pri-
ority process, the probability of the other processes remaining in the group depends
on the probability the current grouping is maintained. In the second scenario, where
processes are ungrouped, the probability only depends on the probability they suc-
cessfully contact the highest priority process. The last scenario is identical to the
second, as the processes will behave as though they are ungrouped when contacted
by the highest priority process.
The only observation that can be made by the highest priority process is the
inclusion or exclusion of the other processes in their group. The probability of the
processes excluded in the group joining the group is independent of their current state.
Let XG be the set of states for the HMM where the other processes are excluded from
P0’s group, and in their own group led by P1. XU is the set of states where the
processes are excluded from P0’s group and are themselves ungrouped. By the nature
of the algorithm:
Pr(O(D0, xk+1)|xk ∈ XG) = Pr(O(D0, xk+1)|xk ∈ XU). (6.5)
As a result, the ungrouped and grouped sub-cases have the same probability of result-
ing in a particular Yk+1. Furthermore, based on the observations of the ungrouped
process:
O(D0, xi) = O(D0, xj) = b, ∀xi ∈ XG, ∀xj ∈ XU . (6.6)
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The equation indicates every observation of a state in XG and XU looks identical to
P0. With this restriction, where v = {xi|O(D0, xi) = a}:
Pr(Yk+1 = a|Yk = b) =
∑
v
Pr(Xk+1 = xi|Xk = xj),∀xj ∈ {xj|xj ∈ XU ∪XG}. (6.7)
Where XU ∪XG is the complete set of states for processes not in P0’s group.
Case 11.3. The system has a number of other processes (n > 2).
Since the interactions of the other processes do not affect the probability of
joining P0’s group, the previous case directly extends to this case.
6.4.3 Model Construction. Based on the state determination and memo-
rylessness arguments presented, the highest priority process operates independent of
the state of the other processes in the system. The structure of the algorithm prevents
any process from being locked out of participating in a round of execution based on
the outcome of the previous round. Therefore, for every observation of the system
state the highest priority process makes, the next round of execution for all the other
processes favors the high priority process, ensuring that its observation corresponds
directly with the system state.
The states of the Markov chain are the cardinality of the highest priority pro-
cess’ group. In each round, the behavior is described by two components: maintaining
a group and inviting other processes into the group. The coordinator will exchange
an “Are You Coordinator” message and the peer will respond to verify it is still
available. To maintain a group of m other processes, the probability is defined as a
random variable with the following pdf:
Pr
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where k is the number of processes remaining in a group selected from m processes.
A process will leave a group if, from the considered process’ perspective, they do not
respond to an “Are You Coordinator” message.
To invite other processes to the group, the two processes ultimately exchange
up to 8 messages. In a round, a single process can invite many other processes to
its group. From a selection of n other coordinators, the probability distribution for
joining a new group with k of the n processes is:
Pr
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p8k(1− p8)n−k, if 0 ≤ k ≤ n
0, otherwise.
(6.9)
In the profile chain, in a state s that describes the number of processes in a group,









(X = i; s− 1)∗
Pr
I
(X = s′ − i;n− s− 1). (6.10)
From this distribution, a set of transition probabilities can be calculated for a given
probability of delivery p and number of processes n. This set of transition probabilities
forms a profile Markov chain P , which can be evaluated for any number of processes n
and probability of delivery p. The generated profile chain is ergodic when 0 < p < 1.0.
The profile chain is a stationary Markov chain.
6.4.4 Model Validation. To assert the closed-form profile chain accurately
represents the implementation of the algorithm, it must be validated. Since T and
P are ergodic, they can be checked for equivalence using a goodness-of-fit test. If
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the goodness-of-fit test indicates the chains are equivalent, they will generate similar
sequences and have similar properties when analyzed. Therefore, generated P chains
can be used to analyze the behavior of the algorithm during live execution with
changing conditions.
To verify the test chain T is equivalent to the profile chain P , a χ2 goodness-
of-fit test is employed. The null-hypothesis of the test (H0) asserts the profile chain
P is equivalent to the test chain T :
H0 : T = P. (6.11)
With an alternative hypothesis that the two chains are not equivalent:
H1 : T 6= P. (6.12)
The χ2 test measures the goodness-of-fit for a complete chain by combining the mea-
surements of goodness of fit for the transitions away from each state. Therefore, the










where ni is the number of times the state i was observed in the input sequence used to
construct the test chain T . The summation is distributed as χ2 with m(m−1) degrees
of freedom (DF) if all entries in Pij are non-zero. In this work, all transitions in the
profile Markov chain P are non-zero when 0 < p < 1.0. However, the probability of
some transitions may be extremely small. The χ2 value was compared to a critical
value (CV) giving a measure of how likely it was H0 could not be rejected. This work
selected an α = 0.05 significance level to reject the hypothesis T = P .
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If the hypothesis H0 were to be rejected, it would indicate the test chain and
profile chain differ significantly. As a consequence of rejecting the hypothesis, the
implementation would have behavior from the generated closed-form solution.
To verify the model, it was compared to runs of an implementation of the
algorithm. Test data was collected for systems with 3, 4, 5 and 6 processes. Informa-
tion was collected from sufficiently long runs of the system with a delivery probability
between 0.05 and 0.95 tested at intervals of 0.05. Table 6.2 shows the measured error
and p-value for the worst observed error for each number of processes. Since the
measured error is less than the critical value and the p-value is greater than 0.05, we
cannot reject H0. As a consequence, the profile chains (P ) are representative of the
behavior of the algorithm.
Table 6.2 Summary of χ2 tests performed.
Processes DF CV Worst Error Pr(WorstError) p-value
3 6 12.6 8.90 0.80 0.18
4 12 21.0 14.55 0.75 0.27
5 20 31.4 23.47 0.65 0.27
6 30 43.8 32.69 0.85 0.34
6.4.5 Profile Chain Analysis. Resources can only be managed effectively
when multiple DGI coordinate together to manage those resources. Without another
DGI to coordinate with, the DGI has a limited range of options to manage power
generation, storage, and loads. Therefore, the amount of time the DGI will spend
coordinating with another process is of particular interest. [40] defines an In-Group
Time (IGT) metric to measure the amount of time a DGI process spends coordinating
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with at least one other process. In this work, we define IGT based on the steady state
of the profile chain. Let pi = Steady(P ) for some profile chain.






The IGT is a number between 0 and 1. It represents the probability a random
observation sees a group of at least two members. The steady state distributions are
presented as stacked bar graphs in Figures 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. Each complete bar
in the graph indicates the IGT. Additionally, these figures contain the average group
size (AGS) when the system has reached the steady-state plotted as a fraction of the
total number of processes. Let P be the steady-state distribution vector for some
number of processes, n, and a given probability of delivery rate:
y =
∑n
i=1 Pi ∗ i
n
(6.15)
where y is the plotted average group size (AGS) as a fraction. The components of each
bar represent the probability the system is in a specific state for a random observation
of the system. The height of the component represents the relative probability of
observing that state when in a group.
The profile chain can be used to ensure the FREEDM smart-grid is able to
continue operating despite network issues. The profile chain can be combined with
different message-sending strategies to maintain service. For example, the DGI can
change its behavior to ensure operation continues normally despite connectivity issues.
By selecting different strategies depending on the message delivery probability, the
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DGI can offer high performance in good network conditions and an acceptable level
of service during faults. The profile chain can be extended to an arbitrary number of
processes as shown in Figure 6.7. In the figure, the steady-state of the system is used
to compute a weighted average of the group size. To compare the produced steady
states, the weighted average is plotted as a percentage of all processes in the system.
Values in Figure 6.7 are plotted using Equation 6.15. Therefore, Figure 6.7 shows














































Steady State For 3 Process Model
Group Size 2
Group Size 3
AGS as a Fraction
Figure 6.3 Steady state distribution for 3 processes as well as the AGS as a fraction
of total processes.
We had hoped to observe an upper limit for the number of processes in a group,
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Figure 6.7 Average group size as a percentage of all processes in the system for
larger systems.
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can spend coordinating. If this limit existed, it would provide a suggestion for an
ideal group size when the DGI was being deployed. However, this was not observed.
Instead, we observed how fragile a grouping of processes would be during omission
failures: the omission probability strongly affects the grouping of processes. Cases
where omission caused processes to leave the group are particularly concerning. In
those cases, processes enter a state where they are not grouped with any of the other
processes, meaning they cannot coordinate to manage power resources. A balance
must be struck between preventing omission faults from breaking up the group and
halting work and keeping a grouping that causes physical faults with failed migrations.
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7 APPLICATION: ECN HARDENING
We considered the effects of network congestion on a cyber communication
network used by the FREEDM smart-grid using a model of DGI processes in a par-
titioned network. By applying background traffic to the partitioned network, we
create a situation where real-time deadlines are missed due to queuing delays. In the
FREEDM smart-grid, the consequences of network congestion could result in sev-
eral problematic scenarios. First, if the congestion prevents DGI from autonomously
configuring using its group management system, processes cannot work together to
manage power devices. Secondly, if messages arrive too late, or are lost, the DGI could
apply settings to the attached power devices, driving the physical network to insta-
bility. Unstable settings could lead to problems in the power grid such as frequency
instability, blackouts, and voltage collapse. Congestion response techniques allow the
DGI to anticipate behavior during a fault and allow it to harden itself against the
fault. In a smart-grid system, interfering traffic can originate from the use of public
infrastructure[53][34], a misconfigured device, changing networking requirements as
new devices enter the network, or from an attacker in a DoS attack.
The DGI employed a round-robin schedule where each module was given a
predetermined amount of time to execute. The schedule was determined by the
number of DGI that could be grouped together and the expected cyber network con-
ditions. Additionally, the load balance module, which managed the power resources,
was scheduled to run multiple times in a long block before the group was evaluated
for failure. This schedule is depicted in Figure 7.1.
The system began by using group management to organize groups. Next, load
balancing ran to manage power resources in the created group. Finally, state collec-
tion obtained a causally consistent state to be used for reporting and offline analysis.
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For the purpose of the ECN experiments presented in the subsequent sections, we
opted to not use the state collection module. If message delays occurred, the number
of migrations load balancing could perform was reduced. However, by reducing the
group size, the number of messages sent by load balancing could be reduced, allowing
for a greater amount of work to be done. The outcome of an election had a direct
effect on how effectively the DGI can manage resources.
Group 













Normal Operation Migration Migration Migration Migration Migration
Delayed Operation MigrationMigration Migration
Reduced Group
Operation Migration Migration Migration Migration Migration
Figure 7.1 Example DGI schedule. Normal operation accounts for a fixed number of
migrations each time the load balancing module runs. Message delays reduce the
number of migrations that can be completed each round. However, reducing the
group size allows more migrations to be completed (because fewer messages are
being exchanged) at the cost of flexibility for how those migrations are completed.
This information can also be used to anticipate faults and mitigate them before
they occur. Modern routers can supply an expected congestion notification as part of
the IP header[23]. When congestion is anticipated, the coordinator can preemptively
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split the group to reduce congestion. This is possible because the load balancing
algorithm’s message complexity is O(n2). If future congestions causes an omission
probability of as little as 0.15, performing a coordinated group division can potentially
avoid transient states where processes cannot coordinate.
The coordinated group division has three main benefits: Breaking the large
groups into smaller groups drastically reduces the number of messages transmitted
and helps relieve congestion. The coordinator can design the split to ensure work
continues by mixing supply and demand processes. The division can also account for
the placement of routers for targeted congestion relief.
7.1 THEORY OF OPERATION
In the simulated network, the router and the two switches were ECN enabled
devices. The devices monitored their incoming packet queues for each of their inter-
faces and used the RED algorithm to determine when to mark a packet for ECN.
Since ECN fields in an IPv4 header are not directly available to an application, the
notifications were multicast onto the source interface(s) of the packet that triggered
the notification. Each network device ran an application responsible for generating
the multicast ECN message.
When the RED algorithm identifies congestion, it must notify senders. Be-
cause the approach is non-standard and most UDP applications would not understand
the notification, we opted to create an application to run on switches and routers.
When congestion is detected, the application sends a multicast beacon to a group
of interfaces informing the attached devices of the level of congestion. For similarity
with the RED algorithm and the NS-3 implementation, the notification is classified
as either “soft” or “hard.” A soft notification is an indication the congestion in the
network is approaching a level where real-time processes can expect message delays
which may affect their normal operation. A hard notification indicates the congestion
has reached a level where messages are subject to both delay and loss.
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7.2 GROUP MANAGEMENT
The group management module’s execution schedule is broken into several
periods of message generation and response windows. Because the schedule of the
DGI is partially synchronous, the traffic generated by modules occurs in bursts. The
number of messages sent by group management is O(n2) (where n is the number of
processes in the system). The duration of the response window is dependent on the
amount of time it takes for messages to propagate to the hardest-to-reach process.
To contend with congestion, slack, in the form of idle time, must be added to allow
the RED algorithm to detect congestion before it reaches a critical level. Figure 7.2
depicts typical queuing behavior for a network device serving DGI processes under
different circumstances.
Because the traffic generated by DGI modules occurs in bursts, there is a
phenomenon where the traffic bursts mix with steady background traffic to cause
the packet queue at the network device to fill. With no background traffic, the
impulse queues many messages, but those messages are distributed within real-time
constraints. When the background traffic is introduced, the queue takes longer to
empty. At a critical threshold, the queue does not empty completely before the next
burst is generated by the DGI and services provided by the DGI are disrupted. If the
level of other traffic is sufficiently high, the queue completely fills, and no messages
can be distributed. The RED algorithm and ECN are used to delay or prevent the
queue from reaching this critical threshold.
7.2.1 Soft ECN. A soft ECN message indicates the network has reached
a level of congestion where the router suspects processes will not be able to meet
their real-time requirements. The soft ECN message encourages the DGI processes
to decrease the number of messages they send, reducing the amount of congestion
they contribute to the network and to allow for reliable distribution techniques to









Figure 7.2 Example of network queuing during DGI operation. DGI modules are
semi-synchronous and create traffic bursts on the network. When there is no other
traffic on the network (solid line), the traffic bursts cause many packets to queue
quickly, but the queue empties at a similar rate. With background traffic (dashed
line), the traffic bursts cause many packets to be queued suddenly. More packets
arrive continuously, causing the queue to drain off more slowly. When the
background traffic reaches a certain threshold (dotted line), the queue does not
empty before the next burst occurs. When this happens, messages will not be
delivered in time, and the queue may completely fill.
the case of potential congestion, the group management module can reduce its traffic
bursts by disabling elections during the congestion. When elections are disabled,
messages for group management are only sent to members of the group. Processes
do not seek out better or other leaders with which to merge. As a consequence, the
message complexity for processes responding to the congestion notification reduces
from O(n2) to O(n).
7.2.2 Hard ECN. In a hard ECN scenario, the router will determine con-
gestion has reached a threshold where the real-time processes will soon not be able to
meet their deadlines. In this scenario, the real-time process will likely split its group.
In an uncontrolled situation, the split will be random, and time will be wasted while
the system is reorganizing. It is therefore desirable when this level of traffic is reached
to split the group. Splitting the group reduces the number of messages sent across
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the router for modules with O(n2) (where n is the number of processes in the origi-
nal group) message complexity. For larger groups, splitting them provides significant
savings in the number of messages that must be queued by the router, especially since
the traffic occurs in bursts.
Consider a network like one depicted in Figure 7.3, where processes are divided
by a router. Here, there are n processes on one side of the network and m on the
other. In normal operation, the omission-modelable algorithm has an O(n2) message
complexity. In Soft ECN maintenance mode, the reduced number of messages reduces


















Figure 7.3 Example of process organization. Two groups of processes are connected
by a router.
During elections (and with each group update) the leader distributes a fallback
configuration that will coordinate the division of the groups during intense congestion.
When the ECN notification is received, the processes will halt all current group
management operations and enter a splitting mode where they switch to the fallback
configuration. The leader of the group distributes a fallback notification to ensure all
processes in the group apply their new configuration. The complexity of distributing
the notification is linear O(n) and processes that already received the notification will
81
have halted their communication. This approach will ideally avoid the burst/drain
phenomena from Figure 7.2.
The design of the fallback configuration can be created to optimize various
factors. The factors include cyber considerations, such as the likely network path the
processes in the group will use to communicate. By partitioning the group around
cyber network resources, the group can be selected to minimize the amount of traffic
that crosses the congested links in the future. Additionally, constraints of the physical
network can be considered. Fallback groups can be created to ensure they can continue
to facilitate the needs of the members. The design of the configuration can take into
the consideration the distribution of supply and demand processes in the current
group. By having a good mix of process types in the fallback group, the potential for
work can remain high.
7.3 CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM
For a real-time CPS, message delays could affect coordinated actions. As a
result, actions may not happen at the correct moments, or at all. Since the two-army
problem prevents any process from being entirely certain a coordinated action will
happen in concert, problems arising from delay or omission of messages is of particular
interest. Specifically, we are interested in the scenario from [16], where only half of
a power migration is performed. Other power management algorithms could have
similar effects on the power system based on this idea of a process performing an
action that does not have a corresponding, compensating action.
7.3.1 Soft ECN. In a soft congestion mode, the process being informed of
the congestion can reduce its effect on the congestion by changing how often it gener-
ates traffic bursts. Processes running the load balancing algorithm make several traffic
bursts when they exchange state information and prepare migrations. As shown be-
fore, if the interval between these bursts is not sufficient for the queue to drain before
the next burst occurs, then critical, overwhelming congestion occurs. The schedule of
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the DGI is fixed at run-time and processes cannot simply extend the duration of the
load balancing execution phase. However, on notification from the leader, the pro-
cess can reduce the number of migrations to increase the message delivery interval.
The notification to reduce the schedule originates from the coordinator as part of the
message exchange necessary for the process to remain in the group. Every process
in the group must receive the message to participate in load balancing, ensuring all
processes remain on the same real-time schedule. By using this approach, the amount
of traffic generated is unchanged but the period a process waits for the messages to
be distributed is increased.
7.3.2 Hard ECN. When the DGI process receives a hard congestion notifi-
cation, the processes switch to a predetermined fallback configuration. The configura-
tion creates a cyber partition. By partitioning the network, the number of messages
sent by applications with O(n2) message complexity can be reduced significantly.
Each migration of the load balancing algorithm begins with an O(n2) message burst
and so benefits from the reduced group size created by the partition.
Consider a network like the in Figure 7.3 with n processes on one half and
m on the other. The number of messages sent across the router for the undivided
group is of the order 2mn as the n processes on side A send a message to the m
on side B and vice-versa. Let i1 and j1 be the number of processes from side A
and side B (respectively) in the first group created by the partition. Let i2 and j2
be the number of processes in the second group created by the partition under the
same circumstances of i1 and j1. The number of messages sent that pass through the
router, is then:
2i1j1 + 2i2j2. (7.1)
83
For an arbitrary group division, the following can be observed. Suppose i1 and j2
are the cardinality of two arbitrarily chosen sets of processes from side A and side B
respectively. Following the same cut requirements as before:
i2 = n− i1 and j2 = m− j1. (7.2)
The number of messages that must pass through the router for this cut is:
2i1j1 + 2(n− i1)(m− j1). (7.3)













) = mn (7.4)
which is a reduction of half as many messages. For systems with many participating
processes, a significant reduction in the number of messages sent across the router is
achieved. As a consequence, this further extends the delivery window for processes
sending messages by decreasing channel utilization.
7.4 RELATION TO OMISSION MODEL
The synchronization of clocks in the environment is assumed to be normally
distributed around a true time value provided by the simulation. The shape of the
curve created by plotting the queue is a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of
the normal distribution, noted as F (x). A simple description of the traffic behavior
can then be described in terms of that curve. First, when the queue hits a specific
threshold, even if the queue is drained at an optimal rate, the nth queued packed will
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not be delivered in time:
Qsize−min(Qsize, (DequeueRate ∗∆t)) ≥ 0 (7.5)
where ∆t is the deadline for the message to be delivered. If the size of the queue
exceeds the number of messages that can be delivered before ∆t passes, some messages
will not be delivered. The size of the queue during the message bursts created by the
DGI depends on the message complexity of the algorithm, the number of messages
already in the queue, the other traffic on the network, and any replies needing to be
delivered in that interval. Therefore, let c represent the rate traffic is generated by
other processes. Let initq represent the number of messages in the queue at the start
of a burst. Let initm represent the number of messages sent in the beginning of the
burst. Let resp represent the number of messages sent in response to the burst that
must still be delivered before ∆t passes. We can then express Qsize as two parts:
Qsize = Burst+Obligations (7.6)
where Burst takes the form of the CDF for the normal distribution:
Burst = initm ∗ F (x) (7.7)
and
Obligations = c ∗∆t+ initq + resp. (7.8)
From this we can derive the equation:




where, from Equation 7.5, DequeueRate ∗∆t is less than or equal to the number of
messages in the queue. Solving for F (x) gives a worst case estimate of the probability
of delivery for a specific algorithmic or network circumstance. DequeueRate is af-
fected by the amount of traffic in the system. It should be noted, a greater amount of
background traffic corresponds to a greater average queue size. From a relationship
between the background traffic, the average queue size, and the results presented in
the previous chapters, Equation 7.9 can be used to select the ECN parameters.
7.5 PROOF OF CONCEPT
Experiments were run in a Network Simulator 3.23[18] test environment. The
simulation time replaced the wall clock time in the DGI for the purpose of trigger-
ing real-time events. As a result, the computation time on the DGI for processing
and preparing messages was neglected. However, to compensate for the lack of pro-
cessing time, the synchronization of the DGI was randomly distributed as a normal
distribution. This was done to introduce realism to ensure events did not occur si-
multaneously. Additionally, the real-time schedules used by the DGI were adjusted
to remove the processing time that was neglected in the simulation. The schedule
used is depicted in Figure 7.4. Each burst of messages was allotted one second for
those messages and their replies to propagate. During the load balancing execution
period, ten migrations are performed on the normal schedule. Soft ECN increased the
message propagation time for the load balancing module to 1.5 seconds and reduced
the number of migrations each round to six.
The DGI were placed into a partitioned environment. The test included 30
nodes. Each of the nodes ran one DGI process. Two sets of 15 DGI were each
connected to a switch and each switch was in turn connected to the router. The
network is pictured in Figure 7.3. Node identifiers were randomly assigned to nodes
in the simulation and used as the process identifier for the DGI. In the experiments,
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Figure 7.4 Execution schedule used in experiments.
the load at each process was randomly assigned: each side is mix of supply and
demand processes.
The links between the router and the switches had a RED enabled queue
placed on both network interfaces. The RED parameters for all queues were set
identically. A summary of RED parameters are listed in Table 7.1. Any parameters
not included in the table used the NS-3 default value. All links in the simulation
were 100Mbps links with a 0.5ms delay. RED was used in packet count mode to
determine congestion. ARP tables were populated before the simulation began. RED
parameters were selected using results from the previous chapter.
The relationship between the background traffic and the average queue size
was estimated through runs of the NS-3 simulation. Figure 7.5 demonstrates the
observed relationship between the total background traffic and the maximum average
queue size for that level of traffic. Additionally, the DequeueRate was collected from a
run of the simulation without traffic, and was found to be 713.08 packets per second.
Therefore, from Equation 7.9, assuming initq = 0, resp = 225, initm = 225, and
∆t = 1, the maximum traffic rate with no omissions was 263.0 packets per second.
The number of packets for the resp and initm were selected from the worst case
of the modified election algorithm. Based on the traffic parameters in Table 7.1,
263.0 packets/second corresponded to 1.077Mbps of traffic generated at one switch
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Table 7.1 Summary of RED parameters.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
RED Queueing Mode Packet RED Gentle Mode True
RED Qw 0.002 RED Wait Mode True
RED Min Threshold 90 RED Max Threshold 130
RED Link Speed 100Mbps RED Link Delay 0.5 ms
and 2.1545Mbps traffic overall. From the polynomial estimate in Figure 7.5, the
maximum average queue size for that level of traffic was 94.715, estimated as 90
for the RED Min Threshold in Table 7.1. RED Max Threshold is computed using a
similar technique, but using the message complexity for the load balancing algorithm,
since it maintained its complexity during Soft ECN mode.






























Figure 7.5 Plot of the maximum observed average queue size as a function of the
overall background traffic. The polynomial estimate is y = 22.70x2 − 44.74x+ 85.72.
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To introduce traffic, processes attached to each of the switches attempted to
send a high volume of messages to each other across the router. The number of
packets sent per second was a function of the data rate and the size of the packets
sent. In each simulation, half of the traffic originated from each switch. Due to the
properties of the network links, the greatest queueing effect occurred at the switches.
7.6 RESULTS
Six test scenarios were created to evaluate the ECN technique. These scenarios
are summarized in Table 7.2. In each scenario, the distribution of supply and demand
processes is mixed: each switch has both supply and demand processes. The potential
of the system to complete migrations, as well as the potential for migrations to fail
were primary considerations for each scenario. Processes cannot initiate migrations if
they are not grouped with other processes. Similarly, if the process is attempting to
communicate over a congested link, it may not meet real-time deadlines or successfully
complete migrations. Figure 7.6 shows the distribution of group sizes observed by the
highest priority process in each scenario. The height of each colored segment indicates
the portion of the simulation where process 0 was in the given configuration.
Table 7.2 Summary of test configurations.
Test Traffic Notifications Attempted Migrations
A None N/A 1171
B 2Mbps N/A 1171
C 4Mbps None 1114
D 4Mbps Soft 888
E 6.4Mbps Soft 861
F 6.4Mbps All 888
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Figure 7.6 Distribution of group sizes for process 0 in each scenario.
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 (Scenario A) show the normal operation of the system.
In this configuration, there is no congestion on the network. The DGI start, group
together and then begin migrating power between processes. Figure 7.7 plots the
queue size over time for a queue used to send packets from a switch to the router.
Figure 7.8 is a detailed view of a portion of Figure 7.7; it shows the queue size during
the normal operation of group management as well as the first three migrations of
a load balancing round. In the normal schedule, the DGI allocates approximately
1 second to each migration and performs 10 migrations each round. In the figure,
the dark gray section is the period where the group management module executes.
The alternating white and light gray sections are the execution periods for individual
migrations. The dotted line plots the EWMA of the size of the queue. An important
note for the plotted EWMA values: NS-3 only updates the average queue size during
simulation when a new packet is enqueued. As a consequence, the average queue size
is slightly misleading in scenarios where there is a significant amount of idle channel
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time (such as Figures 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9). In scenarios A and B, the traffic is not
sufficient to disrupt the operation of the DGI. As a result, in Figure 7.6, process 0
has an uninterrupted observation of a group size of 30 throughout the two scenarios.

















Queue Size Over Time (No Traffic)
Queue Size
Figure 7.7 Test configuration A. Plot of the queue size for a queue from switch A to
the router when only the DGI generates traffic.
From scenario A and B we establish the minth value used as a RED queue
parameter. The traffic generated by each step of the group management algorithm
occurs in bursts. The tightness of the clock synchronization in the group affects the
size of the peak. Like [68], the level of power at a process is the net sum of its power
generation capability and load. As power is shared on the network, processes with
excess generation, converge toward zero net power. Demand processes also converge




Figure 7.8 Test configuration A (detailed view). Detailed view of Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.9 shows the queue size as the network traffic begins to increase. The
DGI in these experiments used a schedule that allowed for some congestion to occur
before processes are disrupted. The slack gave network devices the opportunity to
identify when the network congestion would go beyond the acceptable threshold.
Compared to Figure 7.8, the peaks in Figure 7.9 are taller and wider. As with Figure
7.8, this figure shows three migrations.
Figure 7.10 (Scenario C) shows an example of congestion affecting the physical
network without ECN. In this scenario, the queue does not empty completely before
the next burst of traffic. As a result of the congestion in Figure 7.10, processes leave
the main group, shown in 7.6. As a result, group management generates a large peak
as it tries to rejoin groups that have broken due to the message delays. The observed
configurations have greater than 15 processes because communication that does not




Figure 7.9 Test configuration B. Detailed view of the effect on queue size as other
network traffic is introduced.
the same switch as process 0 do not leave 0’s group. Load balancing has smaller and
less pronounced peaks because the groups are smaller. Power migrations are affected
by congestion: migrations fail, or the supply process is left uncertain of a migration’s
completion. Figure 7.11 plots the count of failed migrations over time. The number
of failed migrations relative to the number attempted is quite low, because processes
on the same switch as process 0 can still attempt migrations.
Figure 7.12 (Scenario D) shows an example of the ECN algorithm notifying
processes of the congestion. The group management module entered a maintenance
mode where it suspended discovering leaders of other groups. Compared to the sce-
nario in Figure 7.10 (Scenario C), the ECN algorithm successfully prevents the group
from dividing. The module’s message complexity decreased to O(N), resulting in the
lack of a noticeable peak compared to previous scenarios. Only two migrations are




Figure 7.10 Test configuration C. Detailed view of the effect on queue size as
network traffic is introduced without notifications.


















Lost Migrations Over Time
2 Mbps traffic, no notifications
4 Mbps traffic, no notifications
4 Mbps traffic, only soft notifications
6.4 Mbps traffic, all notifications
6.4 Mbps traffic, only soft notifications
No traffic, no notifications
Figure 7.11 Count of lost migrations from all processes over time.
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migrations attempted are reduced, as listed in Table 7.2. Load balancing has higher
peaks than in Figure 7.10 because processes have not left the group. However, the
reduced schedule is sufficient to prevent lost migrations. In [15], when the number of
migrations are reduced, the size of each migration is increased. Despite fewer migra-
tions being attempted, the same amount of power can be managed by the DGI, and
the number lost migrations is reduced by the changed schedule.
group management
load balancing
Figure 7.12 Test configuration D. Detailed view of the effect on queue size as
network traffic is introduced with soft ECN notifications.
Figures 7.13 (Scenario E) and 7.14 (Scenario F) show an example of a more
extreme congestion scenario. In Figure 7.13, group management enters a maintenance
mode when it receives the soft ECN notification, but it is not sufficient to maintain
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groups; processes leave the group randomly. The system decreased the number of
migrations per round, as it had done in Figure 7.12. However, migrations were lost.
In Figure 7.14, the RED algorithm shares a Hard ECN notification. The noti-
fication causes the DGI to switch to a smaller fallback configuration, which decreases
the queue usage from Figure 7.13 to Figure 7.14. Without this fallback configuration
behavior, the system is greatly affected by the traffic. The group management module
produced more traffic than in Figure 7.13, but, no DGI left the fallback groups. The
smaller group size allowed the amount of traffic from the load balancing module to
be reduced and prevented lost migrations.
group management
load balancing
Figure 7.13 Test configuration E. Detailed view of the effect on queue size as a large




Figure 7.14 Test configuration F. Effect on queue size as a large amount of network
traffic is introduced with hard notifications enabled.
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8 CONCLUSION
We presented a useful framework for reasoning about distributed systems that
tolerate omission faults. The models and structures presented in the framework allow
algorithms to be designed with behaviors that can be modeled with a Markov chain.
To create the framework, existing information flow analysis techniques were
applied to common distributed systems problems. We showed the information flow-
based analysis was consistent with previous work. The analysis was extended to rea-
son about a leader election algorithm. We described belief sets created by distributing
information to several other agents in the system and showed which portions were
MSDND secure.
Additionally, we defined how information being transferred between agents
and the actions they take based on that information could be modified to have the
memorylessness property of Markov chains. Using this concept we demonstrated how
a common leader election algorithm could be modified to use this memorylessness
property, allowing it to be modeled online during changing conditions.
Our work is particularly valuable for the analysis of critical infrastructure sys-
tems, where knowledge of their behavior during fault conditions is important. By
allowing the ability for algorithms to determine what issues are likely to arise while
they are operating, actions can be taken to protect the infrastructure from failure.
There are a wide range of possible applications, including actions either undertaken
by human operators on site, or autonomous actions taken by the algorithms to harden
themselves against failure. We presented a technique for hardening a real-time, dis-
tributed cyber-physical system against network congestion. The RED queueing algo-
rithm and an out-of-band version of explicit congestion notification (ECN) were used
to signal an application of congestion. Using this technique, the application changed
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several of its characteristics to ready itself for the increased message delays caused by
the congestion.
Techniques were demonstrated on the DGI, a distributed control system for
the FREEDM smart-grid project. We showed the hardening techniques were effective
in keeping the DGI processes grouped together. Additionally, the changes applied to
the DGI through cyber-coordinated actions helped prevent potential destabilization
of the physical power network. Our techniques could be applied to any CPS that could
experience congestion on its network, as long as it has the flexibility to change its
operating mode. Potential applications can apply to both the cyber control network




The modified leader election algorithm.
1: Counter ← A random initial identifier
2: AllPeers← {1, 2, ..., N}
3: Coordinators← ∅
4: Group←Me
5: GroupID ← (Me,Counter)
6: Coordinator ←Me
7: Expected← ∅
8: PendingID ← (Me,−1)
9: PendingLdr ←Me






16: PendingID ← (Me, 0)
17: PendingLdr ←Me
18: if Coordinator = Me then
19: for j ∈ (AllPeers− {Me}) do
20: AreY ouCoordinator(j)
21: Expected← Expected ∪ j
22: end for
23: else
24: for j ∈ (AllPeers− {Me}) do
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25: if j < Me then
26: AreY ouCoordinator(j, j ∈ Group)
27: Expected← Expected ∪ j
28: end if
29: end for
30: Expected← Expected ∪ Coordinator
31: AreY ouThere(Coordinator)
32: end if
33: Peers which respond “Yes” to AreY ouCoordinator are put into the Coordinators
set.
34: Processes that respond are removed from Expected.
35: When an AreY ouThere response is “No” and this process is a coordinator, the




39: if Coordinator = Me and PendingLdr >= Me then
40: Group = Group− Expected
41: Group = Group− Coordinators
42: end if
43: if |Coordinators| >= 1 then
44: State← Election
45: Stop work
46: Counter ← Counter + 1
47: PendingID ← (Me,Counter)
48: PendingLdr ←Me
49: Pending ← Group
50: for j ∈ Coordinators do Invite(j,Coordinator,PendingID)
51: end for
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60: if Coordinator = Me and PendingLdr = Me then
61: OldGroup← Group
62: if Pending 6= ∅ then
63: Group← Pending





69: for j ∈ Group do ReadyMsg(j,GroupID,Group)
70: end for






77: if Coordinator = Me then





82: Pending ← ∅
83: PendingLdr ←Me
84: PendingId← (Me,−1)







92: Counter ← Counter + 1
93: GroupID ← (Me,Counter)
94: Coordinators← ∅




























121: PendingID ← Identifier
122: PendingLdr ← Sender
123: State← Reorganization Accept(Sender,Identifier)
124: end function
125:
126: function ReceiveReady(Sender, Identifier, Peers)
127: if PendingID = Identifier or Coordinator = Sender then
128: Group← Peers
129: State← Normal
130: Coordinator ← Sender








138: Counter ← Counter + 1
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